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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 In this appeal, we consider whether two prison 
administrators are entitled to qualified immunity from an 
Eighth Amendment claim that serious deficiencies in the 
provision of medical care by a private, third-party provider 
resulted in an inmate’s suicide.  We agree with the District 
Court that they are not.  For reasons to be discussed, we will 
affirm. 
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I.
1
 
A. 
 Plaintiff-Appellees Karen Barkes, Alexandra Barkes, 
and Brittany Barkes (collectively, “Appellees”) are the widow 
and children, respectively, of decedent Christopher Barkes 
(“Barkes”).2  Barkes committed suicide on November 14, 
2004, while being held at the Howard R. Young Correctional 
Institution (“HRYCI”) in Wilmington, Delaware, awaiting 
transportation to the Violation of Probation Center in Sussex 
County, Delaware.  He had been arrested the previous day on 
an administrative warrant.  Barkes was on probation for a 
March 2004 domestic abuse conviction, and had been arrested 
for loitering while waiting to purchase drugs.  Appellees filed 
suit against then-Delaware Commissioner of Correction 
Stanley Taylor, then-Warden of HRYCI Raphael Williams, 
the Delaware Department of Corrections (“DOC”), and the 
third-party vendor providing medical services in HRYCI, 
First Correctional Medical, Inc. (“FCM”).  Appellants here 
are Taylor and Williams. 
 Barkes was a troubled man with a long history of 
mental health and substance abuse problems.  On March 15, 
1997, Barkes killed two people in a car accident while driving 
drunk.  He pleaded guilty to two counts of second-degree 
vehicular homicide.  Seven months after the accident, on 
                                              
1
 Because we are reviewing the District Court’s denial of 
summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity, we 
view all disputed facts in the light most favorable to the party 
claiming injury.  Wright v. City of Phila., 509 F.3d 595, 597 
n.1, 599 (3d Cir. 2005). 
2
 Karen Barkes appears both in her individual capacity and as 
administrator of Barkes’s estate. 
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October 31, 1997, Barkes attempted suicide while 
incarcerated by ingesting an overdose of pills that he had 
apparently stockpiled.  He was incarcerated at HRYCI (also 
known as Gander Hill Prison), the same facility at which he 
would eventually commit suicide in 2004.  
 Barkes served two and a half years in prison, during 
which time he completed a substance abuse program.  He 
stayed sober for approximately four years before relapsing in 
December 2003.  He entered the Recovery Center for 
Delaware on December 15, 2003, but could stay for only one 
week because of limited funding from his insurance provider.  
On December 21, 2003, police responded to a reported 
domestic altercation at Barkes’s home.  After police placed 
him in handcuffs, he became unconscious and unresponsive.  
Paramedics were called, who opened Barkes’s airways, 
provided oxygen, and administered drugs to counteract a 
suspected heroin overdose.  Barkes admitted – and the 
toxicology report in his medical records confirms – that he 
consumed one and a half pints of vodka and a “bag” of 
heroin, quantity unspecified.  He later characterized this 
overdose as a suicide attempt. 
 Shortly before the December 2003 relapse, Barkes 
checked himself into the Rockford Center in Wilmington, 
Delaware, where he was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress 
disorder.  David Becker, Barkes’s probation officer at the 
time, opined that Barkes was “[n]ot only . . . a threat to the 
community, he is also a threat to himself,” in a “violation 
report” dated February 3, 2004.  JA at 296. 
 On September 10, 2004, sixty-five days before his 
death, Barkes attempted to kill himself twice in one day.  
During an afternoon house visit by a probation officer, Barkes 
was found asleep on top of a bottle of gin.  He appeared to be 
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extremely intoxicated – he apparently could not recall who he 
was – and the officer arrested Barkes.  Two hours after his 
arrest, Barkes had a blood alcohol content (“BAC”) of .222.  
Because of his high BAC the officers took Barkes to a 
hospital, where he admitted to a nurse that he had also 
consumed forty Tylenol tablets.  While being treated, Barkes 
attempted to kill himself by wrapping an IV cord around his 
neck.  Both incidents were recorded in his probation file. 
 Barkes received a new probation officer shortly before 
his death.  In notes dated November 9, 2004 – five days 
before he died – the officer indicated her awareness that 
Barkes suffered from bipolar disorder, attended one therapy 
session and six Alcoholics Anonymous meetings each week, 
and took four medications for his bipolar condition and other 
mental health problems.  The notes also acknowledged three 
individuals – the record suggests that they were therapists, 
counselors, and/or social workers – whom Barkes was 
currently seeing.   
 Barkes was arrested on November 13, 2004 for 
violating his probation.  At approximately 3:00 p.m. that day, 
he underwent a medical intake/screening procedure at HRYCI 
conducted by a licensed practical nurse (“LPN”) who was 
employed by FCM, a private contractor hired to provide 
medical services in the prison.  The intake procedure included 
a form containing questions about Barkes’s mental health, 
including questions about suicidal ideation.  Barkes indicated 
on the form that he had attempted suicide in 2003 but did not 
include the 1997 attempt or the two attempts in September 
2004.  He stated that he had no current suicidal ideation. 
 The intake procedure also screened for seventeen 
suicide risk factors.  If the inmate checked eight or more 
factors on a form, or if certain other serious risk factors were 
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present (for example, the arresting officer expressed concern 
that the inmate was a suicide risk), the on-call physician was 
to be notified and suicide prevention measures initiated.  
Barkes answered yes to two of the questions: (1) that he had a 
psychiatric history; and (2) that he had previously attempted 
suicide.  The LPN completed a standard medical intake form, 
which included questions as to whether Barkes showed signs 
of “altered mental status . . . or abnormal conduct.”  JA at 71.  
The LPN indicated “no” to both.  Barkes also denied having a 
history of drug abuse.  The LPN referred Barkes to mental 
health services on a “routine” urgency level, based on his 
psychiatric history and the 2003 suicide attempt.  
 Barkes was placed alone in a cell in the booking and 
receiving area.  At some point during the evening of 
November 13, Barkes called his wife Karen.  According to 
Karen, Barkes told her that he “can’t live this way anymore,” 
and said that he was going to kill himself.  JA at 2, 72.  It is 
undisputed that Karen did not inform the DOC of Barkes’s 
stated intent. 
 Shortly before 4:00 a.m. on November 14th, in an 
unrelated incident, another inmate at HRYCI was transferred 
to the infirmary from his cell and placed on Psychiatric Close 
Observation, Level II (“PCO II”).  Patients placed on PCO II 
are given a “suicide gown” and are checked every 15 minutes 
by staff.  Appellants’ Br. at 10 (citing Lamb v. Taylor, No. 
08-324, 2011 WL 4006586, at *2 n.1 (D. Del. Sept. 8, 2011) 
(describing medical care at HRYCI in the context of another 
lawsuit arising out of a prison suicide)).   
 At 8:00 a.m. on the 14th, Barkes ate breakfast alone in 
his cell.  Correctional officers observed him lying awake on 
his bed at 10:45, 10:50, and 11:00 a.m., and none recalled 
anything unusual about him or any indication that he was 
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suicidal.  At 11:35 a.m., when an officer arrived at his cell to 
deliver his lunch, Barkes was hanging by a sheet from a steel 
partition.  Medical staff responded and Barkes was taken to a 
hospital, but attempts to resuscitate him were unsuccessful. 
B. 
 FCM entered into a Health Care Services Contract 
with DOC on June 17, 2002, and was the contracted medical 
provider at HRYCI at the time of Barkes’s suicide.  In that 
role it was responsible for inmate intake and medical 
screening.  The DOC reviewed FCM’s performance in 
monthly Medical Review Committee (“MRC”) meetings, 
overseen by DOC Bureau Chief of Management Services 
Joyce Talley.  Talley was the DOC’s appointed representative 
for administering the contract with FCM.  See  Del. Code 
Ann. tit. 11, § 6517(13) (currently codified at Del. Code Ann. 
tit. 11, § 6517(12)) (requiring that the Commissioner of 
Correction “[a]dminister[] the medical/treatment services 
contract, or appoint[] a designee to administer the 
medical/treatment contract”).   
 As Chief of the DOC Bureau of Management Services, 
Talley had many responsibilities.  She testified that her areas 
of oversight responsibility included “fiscal, payroll, 
budgeting, food services for the inmates, health care for the 
inmates, substance abuse for the inmates, management 
information systems, purchasing and warehousing, facilities 
maintenance and construction.”  JA at 364-65.  She further 
testified that, in each of these areas except for health care, she 
relied on a “key manager [to do] the day-to-day”  oversight.  
JA at 366.  The “key manager” was an official within the 
DOC, but with respect to health care services Talley relied on 
FCM and the MRC, testifying that she did not make any 
assessments regarding FCM’s job performance and that no 
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individual working within the DOC “had the knowledge or 
the background . . . [to] go out to see if the medical care was 
provided.”  JA at 367.   
 The contract outlined standards of care to which FCM 
must adhere.  To the extent that the health care standards of 
the American Correctional Association and the National 
Commission on Correctional Health Care (“NCCHC”) 
differed, FCM was to adhere to the higher standard.  Taylor 
testified that he believed that ensuring FCM “deliver[ed] 
health care in accordance with NCCHC standards” was 
sufficient to meet his responsibility to deliver health care to 
the inmate population.  JA at 51.  Williams testified that he 
had a responsibility to ensure that HRYCI was in compliance 
with NCCHC standards, but that he believed he had no 
personal responsibility to ensure FCM’s compliance.  JA at 
55.  Talley also testified that she did not believe it to be her 
responsibility to ensure FCM’s compliance with NCCHC 
standards.  JA at 368 (“Q: Did you believe that it was your 
responsibility when you served in that role as bureau chief 
that you reviewed the compliance with the standards set forth 
by NCCHC? A: No.”). 
 In 1997, NCCHC published standards for use by 
correctional facilities to screen inmates for physical and 
mental health problems during the intake process.  These 
standards included a variety of forms to be completed by 
medical intake staff.  The NCCHC altered its standards in 
2003, doing away with the forms and instead instituting a 
narrative recommendation of various mental health warning 
signs of which all prison staff should be aware and vigilant.  
Though FCM appears to have been relying on the outdated 
1997 forms in 2004 when Barkes was incarcerated, NCCHC 
accredited HRYCI approximately one year before Barkes’s 
suicide.  However, part of Appellees’ theory of liability is that 
 10 
not only did FCM fail to implement the newer guidelines as 
required by its contract, it failed to properly implement the 
1997 NCCHC standards.  Therefore, it is necessary to discuss 
the 1997 NCCHC standards for suicide assessment in some 
detail. 
 The 1997 NCCHC guidelines provided a number of 
sample intake forms covering general physical and mental 
health questions.
3
  These included a suicide-specific 
assessment form that asked questions regarding past and 
current suicidal ideation, mental health treatment, and recent 
emotional trauma.  JA at 310.  There was also a mental health 
screening form that was to be filled out by the intake staff 
member.  The mental health form instructed the screener to 
ask the inmate, in pertinent part: “Have you ever felt so bad, 
so depressed, that you tried to take your own life?”; and 
“Have you ever taken medication for emotional problems, for 
mental illness, or for ‘nerves?’”  JA at 313.  The following 
page of the standards provided criteria for referring an inmate 
to a mental health professional based on answers given in the 
mental health screening form, which stated: 
Refer an inmate to mental health staff for 
assessment if the inmate gives a “Yes” response 
to ANY question.  There are no exceptions to 
this procedure. 
                                              
3
 For example, the first two questions on the general intake 
screening form are: “Was inmate a medical, mental health or 
suicide risk during any prior contact or confinement with 
department?”; and “Do you believe the inmate is a medical, 
mental health or suicide risk now?”  JA at 309.  That form 
also allows the screener to record behavioral observations 
about the inmate and whether they suffer from health 
problems such as heart disease or epilepsy.  
 11 
If the inmate gives an affirmative response to 
question 9,[
4
] make an immediate referral to 
mental health staff and make sure continuous 
“eyes on” supervision is provided until seen by 
the mental health staff. 
Remember, this screening inventory IS NOT 
your only guide for referral to mental health 
services.  Even if there are all “no” answers, 
you may still refer the inmate: 
 if you suspect that, in spite of the 
answers, this inmate is experiencing 
some emotional difficulties; 
 if you need additional mental health 
information on an inmate prior to 
classification; 
 or for reasons not listed here  
JA at 314 (emphasis in original).   
 The 1997 guidelines provided sample protocols to be 
administered by a qualified mental health professional if the 
inmate’s intake screening triggered referral.  JA at 322.  The 
guidelines explicitly required the protocols to be administered 
by a mental health professional.   
 Appellees claim, however, that FCM failed to comply 
with the 1997 NCCHC standards.  They argue that the suicide 
screening form that FCM administered corresponded to the 
screening form to be used by a mental health professional, but 
that FCM allowed the form to be administered by an 
unqualified LPN rather than a qualified mental health 
                                              
4
 Question 9 inquired whether the inmate was currently 
considering killing himself. 
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professional, as required under NCCHC guidelines.  To put it 
simply, Appellees claim that, if FCM had been in compliance 
with NCCHC standards, Barkes’s “yes” answer to the 
question “Have you ever attempted suicide?” and his 
identification of his psychiatric medication would have 
triggered a referral to a mental health professional. The 
professional in turn would have instituted increased suicide 
prevention procedures, thus preventing Barkes’s death. 
 In deposition testimony, Appellants acknowledged that 
they were aware of the deteriorating quality of FCM’s 
provision of medical services. Williams admitted that FCM’s 
performance had degraded significantly and that he was 
aware FCM may not have been fulfilling its contractual 
obligations.  JA at 792.  He was aware of significant 
backlogs, that FCM may have been intentionally short-
staffing to save money, and that inmate complaints had 
increased.  JA at 792-93.  Taylor testified that his 
responsibility as Commissioner of Correction was to “provide 
health care delivery to the offender population comparable to 
that available in the community.”  JA at 799.  He 
acknowledged that in the period of 2003-2007 audits 
conducted by the NCCHC had identified deficiencies in 
healthcare provision in the Delaware prison system.  He also 
suspected that FCM was intentionally leaving positions 
vacant in order to save money rather than simply having 
difficulty recruiting and retaining staff.  Minutes from a 
meeting of the MRC on June 17, 2004, at which Williams 
was present, indicate ongoing problems with the DOC’s 
document management computer system, called “DACS,” 
including that the medical unit at HRYCI was “not putting 
information into DACS consistently for medical grievances.”  
JA at 809.  Talley indicated that FCM was “beyond the 
borderline of not being in compliance with the contract” and 
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that the MRC would issue a letter of non-compliance at the 
next meeting if problems with the computer system were not 
resolved by then.  Id.  Minutes from the MRC’s August 26, 
2004 meeting indicate that FCM remained non-compliant 
with respect to implementing the DACS system, and that this 
issue was to be brought to Taylor’s attention.  In May 2005, 
Taylor wrote a letter to FCM indicating that the DOC would 
be terminating the contract, citing among his reasons “the 
serious deficiencies in the delivery of health care outlined in 
the National Commission on Correctional Health Care 
(NCCHC) audit report dated February 28, 2005.”  JA at 788. 
 
C. 
 On February 16, 2006, Appellees filed a complaint 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District 
Court for the District of Delaware.   
 Appellees asserted against Taylor and Williams an 
Eighth Amendment claim based on deliberate indifference to 
Barkes’s serious medical needs, an Eighth Amendment claim 
based on a failure to train/wrongful customs, practices, and 
policies, and a state law wrongful death claim.  On February 
27, 2008, the District Court granted summary judgment to 
Appellants.  Appellees filed an appeal, see Barkes v. First 
Correctional Medical, Inc., No. 08-2280 (docketed May 7, 
2008), which we dismissed per stipulation of the parties on 
July 9, 2008. 
 On May 21, 2008, while the first appeal was pending, 
the District Court held a show cause hearing on Appellees’ 
motion for default judgment against FCM.  At that hearing, 
the Court granted the motion and granted Appellees leave to 
amend.  They filed a first amended complaint on June 13, 
2008, which Appellants moved to strike on the basis that it 
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reasserted claims upon which they had already prevailed on 
summary judgment.  The Court granted the motion to strike 
on March 30, 2009, but permitted Appellees to file a second 
amended complaint against Appellants provided that it did 
not assert any claims from the previous complaint.  Appellees 
filed a second amended complaint on April 9, 2009, which 
was eventually dismissed.
5
  Appellees were permitted to file a 
third amended complaint only to add an Eighth Amendment 
failure-to-supervise claim, which was filed on April 22, 2010.  
Appellants moved to dismiss the third amended complaint on 
May 6, 2010, and the District Court denied the motion. 
 On February 27, 2012, the parties filed cross-motions 
for summary judgment.  It was then that Appellants asserted 
                                              
5
 It appears that the first amended complaint was filed in the 
District Court before we had dismissed Appellees’ appeal, 
which we dismissed while the motion to strike was pending.  
In the briefing on the motion to strike, the parties discussed 
the then-pending appeal only to acknowledge that it was 
premature because claims remained against FCM in the 
District Court.  No party has raised before us now, and we 
therefore do not consider, whether the District Court was 
without jurisdiction to grant Appellees leave to file the first 
amended complaint.  See Bensalem Twp. v. Int’l Surplus 
Lines Ins. Co., 38 F.3d 1303, 1314 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting the 
general rule that the filing of an appeal divests a district court 
of jurisdiction, but with the exception that “a premature 
notice of appeal does not”) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  If any error existed, it was mooted when 
the District Court struck the first amended complaint and 
granted leave to file a second amended complaint. 
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qualified immunity in a motion for the first time.
6
  The 
District Court denied both motions for summary judgment, 
and Appellants filed this appeal pursuant to the collateral 
order doctrine.   
II. 
 The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and the collateral order doctrine.  The 
collateral order doctrine allows us to review an interlocutory 
order “as a ‘final decision’ if it: ‘(1) conclusively 
determine[s] the disputed question, (2) resolve[s] an 
important issue completely separate from the merits of the 
action, and (3) [is] effectively unreviewable on appeal from a 
final judgment.’”  Blaylock v. City of Phila., 504 F.3d 405, 
408 (3d Cir. 2007) (alterations in original) (quoting Johnson 
v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 310 (1995)).  It is well-established 
                                              
6
 Though it is undisputed that Appellants raised qualified 
immunity in their answer to the third amended complaint, see 
JA at 210, Appellees devote a substantial portion of their brief 
to a discussion of Appellants’ failure to assert the defense 
until so late in this litigation. In their briefs, they do not 
suggest that this is of any legal significance – that Appellants 
waived the defense, for instance – but only that it is 
supposedly “revelatory of [Appellants’] mindset” regarding 
the merits of their qualified immunity argument.  Appellees’ 
Br. at 22.  At oral argument, counsel for Appellees went a 
step further and asked that we find waiver of qualified 
immunity.  Because Appellants asserted qualified immunity 
in their answer, waiver is inappropriate, and whether or not 
they exhibit confidence in their assertion of qualified 
immunity is of no relevance to this appeal.  See Cetel v. 
Kirwan Fin. Grp., 460 F.3d 494, 506 (3d Cir. 2006). 
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that orders denying qualified immunity at summary judgment 
are reviewable under the collateral order doctrine “to the 
extent that denial turns on questions of law.”  Bayer v. 
Monroe Cnty. Children and Youth Serv., 577 F.3d 186, 191 
(3d Cir. 2009)); see also Wright v. City of Phila., 409 F.3d 
595, 599 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Despite the interlocutory nature of 
qualified immunity rulings, they are reviewable on appeal 
where the dispute does not turn upon which facts the parties 
might be able to prove, but, rather, whether or not certain 
facts showed a violation of ‘clearly established’ law.” 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).   
 “On an appeal from a grant or denial of summary 
judgment, our review is plenary and we apply the same test 
the district court should have utilized initially.” Giles v. 
Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 322 (3d Cir. 2009).  A court may 
grant summary judgment only when the record “shows that 
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(a).  The issue of qualified immunity is generally a 
question of law, but a genuine dispute of material fact will 
preclude summary judgment on qualified immunity.  Giles, 
571 F.3d at 326.  
III. 
A. 
1. 
 Before discussing the District Court’s qualified 
immunity analysis, it is necessary first to consider whether 
and to what extent our precedent on supervisory liability in 
the Eighth Amendment context was altered by the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).  
Though we have in the past declined “to wade into the 
muddied waters of post-Iqbal ‘supervisory liability,’”  
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Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 366 n.5 (3d Cir. 2012); see 
also Argueta v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 
643 F.3d 60, 69-70 (3d Cir. 2011), we find it appropriate to 
do so now. 
 Section 1983 provides a cause of action against “every 
person who,” under color of state law, “subjects, or causes to 
be subjected,” another person to a deprivation of a federally 
protected right.  42 U.S.C. § 1983.  It is well-recognized that 
“[g]overnment officials may not be held liable for the 
unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory 
of respondeat superior.”  Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 366 (alteration 
in original) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676).  Rather, state 
actors are liable only for their own unconstitutional conduct.  
Id.  With this principle in mind, we have previously identified 
two general ways in which a supervisor-defendant may be 
liable for unconstitutional acts undertaken by subordinates.  
First, liability may attach if they, “with deliberate indifference 
to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, 
practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional 
harm.”  A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. 
Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 
725 (3d Cir. 1989)).  Second, “a supervisor may be personally 
liable under § 1983 if he or she participated in violating the 
plaintiff’s rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the 
person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced” in the 
subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct.  Id. (citing Baker v. 
Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1995)).  
“Failure to” claims – failure to train, failure to discipline, or, 
as is the case here, failure to supervise – are generally 
considered a subcategory of policy or practice liability.  See 
Rosalie Berger Levinson, Who Will Supervise the 
Supervisors? Establishing Liability for Failure to Train, 
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Supervise, or Discipline Subordinates in a Post-
Iqbal/Connick World, 47 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 273, 280 
(2012). 
 In Sample v. Diecks, we recognized that “‘supervision’ 
entails, among other things, training, defining expected 
performance by promulgating rules or otherwise, monitoring 
adherence to performance standards, and responding to 
unacceptable performance whether through individualized 
discipline or further rulemaking.”  885 F.2d 1099, 1116 (3d 
Cir. 1989).  Sample involved an Eighth Amendment claim 
against a supervisor for implementing deficient policies and 
being deliberately indifferent to the risk that the policies 
would result in the deprivation of a constitutional right.  Id.; 
see also Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 133-34 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (discussing Sample).  We developed a four-part 
test for determining whether an official may be held liable on 
a claim for a failure to supervise.  The plaintiff must identify 
a supervisory policy or practice that the supervisor failed to 
employ, and then prove that: (1) the policy or procedures in 
effect at the time of the alleged injury created an 
unreasonable risk of a constitutional violation; (2) the 
defendant-official was aware that the policy created an 
unreasonable risk; (3) the defendant was indifferent to that 
risk; and (4) the constitutional injury was caused by the 
failure to implement the supervisory practice or procedure. 
Sample, 256 F.3d at 1118; Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 
F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2001).  In this Circuit, when a plaintiff 
seeks to hold a defendant liable under the Eighth Amendment 
in his or her role as a supervisor, “Sample’s four-part test 
provides the analytical structure . . . , it being simply the 
deliberate indifference test applied to the specific situation of 
a policymaker.”  Whetzel, 256 F.3d at 135. 
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 Which brings us to Iqbal.  Javaid Iqbal sued United 
States Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI Director 
Robert Mueller, high-level Executive Branch officials, under 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 
388 (1971).  In Bivens, the Court “‘recognized for the first 
time an implied private action for damages against federal 
officers alleged to have violated a citizen’s constitutional 
rights.’”  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675 (quoting Corr. Serv. Corp. v. 
Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66 (2001)).  Iqbal alleged that he was 
unlawfully detained and subjected to harsh conditions of 
confinement on the basis of his race, religion, or national 
origin, as part of a purposefully discriminatory policy of 
which Ashcroft was the “principal architect” and Mueller was 
“instrumental” in executing.  Id. at 669.  Iqbal’s theory of 
supervisory liability was that Ashcroft and Mueller could be 
liable if they had “knowledge [of] and [had] acquiesce[ed] in 
their subordinates’ use of discriminatory criteria to make 
classification decisions among detainees.”   Id. at 677 
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted).   
 In rejecting Iqbal’s claim, the Supreme Court first 
recognized that “[t]he factors necessary to establish a Bivens 
violation will vary with the constitutional provision at issue.”  
Id. at 676.  The claim presented in Iqbal – discrimination in 
violation of the First and Fifth Amendments – requires that 
the plaintiff prove that the defendant acted with a 
discriminatory purpose, and “purposeful discrimination 
requires more than ‘intent as volition or intent as awareness 
of consequences.’”  Id. (quoting Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. 
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979), and citing Church of 
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 540-41 
(1993); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976)).  The 
Court reasoned that, because such a claim requires that the 
defendant have acted “‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ 
 20 
[the action’s] adverse effects upon an identifiable group,’” id. 
at 676-77 (some internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Feeney, 442 U.S. at  279), it necessarily followed that 
Ashcroft and Mueller could be held liable only if they had 
“adopted and implemented the detention policies at issue . . . 
for the purpose of discriminating on account of race, religion, 
or national origin,” id.  (emphasis added).  The Court rejected 
Iqbal’s argument that supervisory liability could attach based 
on Ashcroft and Mueller’s knowledge of and acquiescence in 
their subordinates’ unconstitutional discrimination, stating: 
“In a § 1983 suit or a Bivens action – where masters do not 
answer for the torts of their servants – the term ‘supervisory 
liability’ is a misnomer. Absent vicarious liability, each 
Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only 
liable for his or her own misconduct.”  Id. at 677.  In reaching 
this conclusion, the Court expressly tied the level of intent 
necessary for superintendent liability to the underlying 
constitutional tort.  See id. at 678 (“In the context of 
determining whether there is a violation of clearly established 
law to overcome qualified immunity, purpose rather than 
knowledge is required to impose Bivens liability on the 
subordinate for unconstitutional discrimination; the same 
holds true for an official charged with violations arising from 
his or her superintendent responsibilities.”).   
 This aspect of Iqbal has bedeviled the Courts of 
Appeals to have considered it, producing varied 
interpretations of its effect on supervisory liability.  The 
dissenters in Iqbal believed the majority to be abolishing 
supervisory liability in its entirety, 556 U.S. at 692-93 
(Souter, J., dissenting), and at least one Court of Appeals 
impliedly confirmed this view, albeit without much in the 
way of discussion, see Carnaby v. City of Houston, 636 F.3d 
 21 
183, 189 (5th Cir. 2011).
7
  The Ninth Circuit, on the other 
hand, has suggested that under Iqbal the United States 
Attorney General could be liable for knowingly “fail[ing] to 
act in the light of even unauthorized abuses” of the federal 
material witness statute, insofar as that statute was used as a 
pretext to detain terrorism suspects despite a lack of probable 
cause of a criminal violation.  See al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 
F.3d 949, 976 (9th Cir. 2009), overruled on other grounds, 
131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011) (overruling the Ninth Circuit on the 
basis of qualified immunity, finding no Fourth Amendment 
violation, and not reaching the supervisory liability question).   
 Most courts have gravitated to the center, recognizing 
that because the state of mind necessary to establish a § 1983 
or Bivens claim varies with the constitutional provision at 
issue, so too does the state of mind necessary to trigger 
liability in a supervisory capacity.  The Tenth Circuit, for 
example, held that, after Iqbal, § 1983 liability may attach to 
“a defendant-supervisor who creates, promulgates, 
implements, or in some other way possesses responsibility for 
the continued operation of a policy the enforcement (by the 
defendant-supervisor or her subordinates) of which ‘subjects, 
or causes to be subjected,’” the plaintiff to a constitutional 
deprivation, if the supervisor “acted with the state of mind 
required to establish the alleged constitutional deprivation.”  
                                              
7
 In Carnaby, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a grant of summary 
judgment in favor of a police officer whose alleged 
supervisory failure led other officers to commit an excessive 
use of force.  636 F.3d at 189.  The Court cited Iqbal for the 
proposition that “[u]nder § 1983 . . . a government official 
can be held liable only for his own misconduct,” id. (citing 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 692-93), but did not consider whether a 
failure to supervise could in some instances be misconduct. 
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Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1199 (10th Cir. 2010) 
(emphasis added).  The Court of Appeals in Dodds reasoned 
that such a standard “complies with Iqbal’s requirement that § 
1983 liability only be imposed upon those defendants whose 
own individual actions cause a constitutional deprivation 
because it requires plaintiffs [to] prove each defendant took 
some act with the constitutionally applicable state of mind 
that caused the alleged constitutional violation.”   Id. at 1200.  
The Ninth Circuit agreed with this view in Starr v. Baca, 
seeing “nothing in Iqbal indicating that the Supreme Court 
intended to overturn longstanding case law on deliberate 
indifference claims against supervisors in conditions of 
confinement cases.”  652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (2011).  See also 
Whitson v. Stone County Jail, 602 F.3d 920, 922, 927-28 (8th 
Cir. 2010) (holding that prison supervisors could be liable on 
an Eighth Amendment claim “only if they personally 
displayed deliberate indifference to the risk” of a 
constitutional deprivation); Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 
F.3d 31, 49 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding, post-Iqbal, that prison 
administrators could be liable in a supervisory capacity for a 
Fourth Amendment violation if their “actions displayed 
deliberate indifference toward the rights of third parties and 
had some causal connection to the subsequent tort”) (quoting 
Camilo-Robles v. Zapata, 175 F.3d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 1999)). 
 The Seventh Circuit has also indicated that the mental 
state required to impose supervisory liability will vary with 
the underlying constitutional tort.  In T.E. v. Grindle, the 
Seventh Circuit held that a school principal could be liable 
under § 1983 for allowing a subordinate teacher to continue 
working despite numerous allegations that the teacher was 
sexually abusing his female students.  599 F.3d 583, 585-87 
(7th Cir. 2010).  The plaintiff alleged supervisory liability that 
derived from both substantive due process and equal 
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protection violations.  The Court recognized that Iqbal had 
abrogated its prior precedent allowing plaintiffs to recover 
from a supervisor who was deliberately indifferent toward a 
subordinate’s purposeful discrimination, because in a 
discrimination claim Iqbal requires that “a plaintiff must 
show that the supervisor possessed . . . discriminatory intent.” 
Id.  But this was not so with respect to the substantive due 
process claim, for which the Court held that “[w]hen a state 
actor’s deliberate indifference deprives someone of his or her 
protected liberty interest . . . , that actor violates the 
Constitution, regardless of whether the actor is a supervisor or 
subordinate.”  Id. at 591.  The Court thus recognized that the 
mental state necessary for supervisory liability tracks with the 
mental state required for the underlying tort.  See also Vance 
v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193, 204 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
 We do not read Iqbal to have abolished supervisory 
liability in its entirety.  Rather, we agree with those courts 
that have held that, under Iqbal, the level of intent necessary 
to establish supervisory liability will vary with the underlying 
constitutional tort alleged.  In this case, the underlying tort is 
the denial of adequate medical care in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, 
and the accompanying mental state is subjective deliberate 
indifference.  See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 
(1994).  Iqbal held that state officials are liable only for their 
own unconstitutional actions.  The essence of the type of 
claim we approved in Sample is that a state official, by virtue 
of his or her own deliberate indifference to known 
deficiencies in a government policy or procedure, has allowed 
to develop an environment in which there is an unreasonable 
risk that a constitutional injury will occur, and that such an 
injury does occur.  Liability in such a situation is, as Iqbal 
requires, imposed not vicariously but based on the 
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supervisor’s own misconduct, because to exhibit deliberate 
indifference to such a situation is a culpable mental state 
under the Eighth Amendment.  See Starr, 652 F.3d at 1207 
(“[W]hen a supervisor is found liable based on deliberate 
indifference, the supervisor is being held liable for his or her 
own culpable action or inaction, not held vicariously liable 
for the culpable action or inaction of his or her 
subordinates.”).   Accordingly, we hold that the standard we 
announced in Sample for imposing supervisory liability based 
on an Eighth Amendment violation is consistent with Iqbal.  
We leave for another day the question whether and under 
what circumstances a claim for supervisory liability derived 
from a violation of a different constitutional provision 
remains valid.   
2. 
 Our dissenting colleague disagrees with our conclusion 
that Sample has survived Iqbal.  In his view, a supervisor can 
be held liable under the Eighth Amendment only if he 
committed an affirmative “action[],” was “personal[ly] 
involve[d] in his subordinates’ misfeasance,” and acted with 
“intentional . . . deliberate indifference.”  Dis. Op. at 9, 19 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Our colleague claims that 
his position recognizes that “there’s no special rule of liability 
for supervisors” and that “the test for them is the same as the 
test for everyone else.”  Id. at 20 (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Porro v. Barnes, 624 F.3d 1322, 1327-28 
(10th Cir. 2010)).  But in fact the opposite is true: his test 
would immunize from liability prison officials who were 
deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk that inmates’ 
serious medical conditions were being mistreated or not 
treated at all.  This would subvert the Supreme Court’s 
command that any prison official who, “acting with deliberate 
indifference, expose[s] a prisoner to a sufficiently substantial 
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risk of serious damage to his future health,” violates the 
Eighth Amendment.  Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844 (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted).  Simply because an 
official may have a senior position in the DOC does not make 
him free to ignore substantial dangers to inmate health and 
safety.  Id. at 842; Grindle, 599 F.3d at 590 (“When a state 
actor's deliberate indifference deprives someone of his or her 
protected liberty interest in bodily integrity, that actor violates 
the Constitution, regardless of whether the actor is a 
supervisor or subordinate, and the actor may be held liable for 
the resulting harm.”).   
 Treating supervisors and subordinates equally under 
the Eighth Amendment does not mean ignoring the different 
ways in which each type of officer can, with deliberate 
indifference, expose inmates to constitutional injury.  We 
think our dissenting colleague fails to recognize this fact, and 
in doing so makes three significant analytical errors.  We 
address each below. 
i. 
 First, the Dissent claims that for a supervisor to be 
liable under § 1983, he must have taken a “deliberate, 
intentional act . . . to violate the plaintiff’s legal rights.”  Dis. 
Op. at 12 (quoting Porro, 624 F.3d at 1327-28).  The Dissent 
draws this principle primarily from the Tenth Circuit’s 
opinion in Porro, which we have cited with approval for its 
discussion of the mental state required to make out a claim of 
supervisory liability.  But on this particular point the 
Dissent’s reliance is off-base.  Porro involved an allegation 
of excessive force by an officer, for which the plaintiff also 
sued the Sheriff (and his successor) as supervisor.  624 F.3d 
at 1324-25.  In affirming the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment to the Sheriff, the Tenth Circuit began by 
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identifying the precise constitutional tort at issue: the use of 
excessive force in violation of the due process clause.  Id. at 
1326.  The court stated that for a supervisor to be liable, he 
must have committed a “deliberate, intentional act.”  Id. at 
1327-28.  Importantly, it made this statement in the context of 
an excessive force claim, which meant that “the focus [was] 
on the force the supervisor used or caused to be used, the 
resulting injury attributable to his conduct, and the mens rea 
required of him to be held liable, which can be no less than 
the mens rea required of anyone else.”  Id. at 1328 (emphasis 
omitted).  But excessive force claims are different than 
conditions of confinement claims: instead of deliberate 
indifference, they require a plaintiff to show that “officials 
applied force ‘maliciously and sadistically for the very 
purpose of causing harm,’ or . . . with ‘a knowing willingness 
that [harm] occur.’”  Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835-36 (quoting 
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992)).  Under the rule 
we derive from Iqbal – that the mental state necessary for 
supervisory liability will vary with the substance of the 
underlying constitutional tort – it makes sense that the Tenth 
Circuit would require deliberate action in that case. 
 The Dissent’s position neglects the black-letter 
principle that the type of Eighth Amendment claim alleged 
here can be shown by an act or an omission.  See Farmer, 511 
U.S. at 835 (“[T]he cases are . . . clear that [the deliberate 
indifference standard] is satisfied by something less than acts 
or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with 
knowledge that harm will result” (emphasis added)); Estelle 
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (“In order to state a 
cognizable claim [under the Eighth Amendment], a prisoner 
must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence 
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” (emphasis 
added)).  What the Dissent attempts to do is shoehorn into the 
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Eighth Amendment the deliberate-act requirement adopted in 
our state-created-danger jurisprudence.  In that context, we 
have held that “[l]iability . . . [must be] predicated upon the 
states’ affirmative acts which work to the plaintiff’s detriment 
in terms of exposure to danger.  It is the misuse of state 
authority, rather than a failure to use it, that can violate the 
Due Process Clause.”  Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 
224, 235 (3d Cir. 2008) (third alteration added; emphasis in 
original) (quoting Bright v. Westmoreland Cnty., 443 F.3d 
276, 282 (3d Cir. 2006)).
8
  The reason for this requirement is 
that the Government is not generally required to “guarantee 
[a] certain minimal level[] of safety and security” to its 
citizens.  Bright, 443 F.3d at 280 (quoting DeShaney v. 
Winnebago Cnty. Soc. Servs. Dep’t., 489 U.S. 189, 195-96 
(1989)).  But this principle does not apply once the 
Government takes custody of the citizen and deprives him of 
his liberty. 
[Our cases] stand only for the 
proposition that when the State 
takes a person into its custody and 
holds him there against his will, 
the Constitution imposes upon it a 
corresponding duty to assume 
some responsibility for his safety 
                                              
8
 The elements of a properly pleaded state-created-
danger claim are: “(1) the harm ultimately caused to the 
plaintiff was foreseeable and fairly direct; (2) the state-actor 
acted in willful disregard for the plaintiff’s safety; (3) there 
was some relationship between the state and the plaintiff; and 
(4) the state-actor used his authority to create an opportunity 
for danger that otherwise would not have existed.”  Phillips, 
515 F.3d at 235. 
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and general well-being. . . . The 
affirmative duty to protect arises 
not from the State’s knowledge of 
the individual’s predicament or 
from its expressions of intent to 
help him, but from the limitation 
which it has imposed on his 
freedom to act on his own behalf. 
 
Id. at 280-81 (alteration in original) (quoting DeShaney, 489 
U.S. at 199-200).  The Dissent cites Grindle in support of its 
claim that an affirmative act is required, and he is correct that 
this case upheld a supervisory liability claim for substantive 
due process deliberate indifference that was predicated upon 
an official’s attempt to “conceal[] reports of abuse and 
creat[e] an atmosphere that allowed abuse to flourish.”  599 
F.3d at 590.  Certainly, an affirmative act such as 
concealment of wrongdoing could satisfy the deliberate 
indifference standard, but it is not necessary.  Under the 
Eighth Amendment, prison officials, from the bottom up, may 
be liable if by act or omission they display a deliberate 
indifference to a known risk of substantial harm to an 
inmate’s health or safety.  Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843.  The 
omission alleged here is the deliberately indifferent failure to 
enforce FCM’s compliance with proper suicide-prevention 
protocols, as required under FCM’s contract with the DOC.  
As we will discuss, there is a material factual dispute on this 
point.   
 
ii. 
 The Dissent would require both that the supervisor 
“personally display[ed] deliberate indifference,” Dis. Op. at 
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20 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted), and that 
the supervisor was “personal[ly] involve[d] in his 
subordinates’ misfeasance,” id. at 9.  With respect to the 
former observation, we agree, which is why our decision 
requires subjective deliberate indifference on the part of the 
offending officer.  See Part III.A.1, supra.  With respect to the 
latter, the Dissent misinterprets the rules for Eighth 
Amendment liability under Farmer.  
 The Dissent asserts that, by affirming Sample’s vitality 
post-Iqbal, our decision wrongly applies an objective, rather 
than a subjective, test for evaluating deliberate indifference, 
in contravention of Farmer.  This criticism is unpersuasive 
for two reasons.  First, the premise upon which the Dissent’s 
argument rests – that “Sample’s objective quality is patent,” 
see Dis. Op. at 19 – is far from clear.  Sample expressly 
constructed its test for deliberate indifference around what the 
officer knew and how the officer reacted to that knowledge.  
Sample, 885 F.2d at 1118 (asking whether the officer “was 
aware that this unreasonable risk existed” and whether that 
officer “was indifferent to that risk” (emphasis added)).  This 
is clearly a subjective test as required by Farmer, a 
conclusion bolstered by our recitation of the Sample test in 
Brown, a case that post-dates Farmer and yet approves 
Sample. See Brown, 269 F.3d at 216.  Far from being patently 
objective, Sample’s test is explicitly concerned with the 
officer’s subjective knowledge. 
 The origin of the Dissent’s discontent may be 
Sample’s reference to City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 
(1989).  In City of Canton, the Supreme Court held that a 
municipality “can be liable for failure to train its employees 
when the municipality’s failure shows ‘a deliberate 
indifference to the rights of its inhabitants.’”  Farmer, 511 
U.S. at 840 (quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 389).  In 
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Farmer, the Court stated that City of Canton, which allowed 
liability to attach based on “obviousness or constructive 
notice,” created an objective test for deliberate indifference 
that was inappropriate in the Eighth Amendment context.  
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 841.  To be sure, Sample stated that it 
derived its test “[b]ased on City of Canton,” 885 F.2d at 1118, 
but the actual test that it articulated clearly sounds in 
subjectivity. 
 The Dissent cites a passage of Sample in which we 
said that “there are situations in which the risk of 
constitutionally cognizable harm is so great and so obvious 
that the risk and the failure of supervisory officials to respond 
will alone support findings of the existence of an 
unreasonable risk, of knowledge of that unreasonable risk, 
and of indifference to it.”  885 F.2d at 1118; Dis. Op. at 19.  
In fairness to our colleague, one could read this as suggesting 
that an objective test might be applicable in situations where 
evidence of the officer’s knowledge and intent was absent. 
But one could also read this statement as recognizing that the 
requisite mental state can be proved by circumstantial 
evidence.  Cf. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842 (“Whether a prison 
official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a 
question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, 
including inference from circumstantial evidence, and a 
factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a 
substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.” 
(emphasis added)).   
 At any rate, this brings us to the second reason that the 
Dissent’s objection fails: the test that we derive from Sample 
and apply in this case cannot be described as anything but 
subjective, and is thus entirely consistent with Farmer.  
Moreover, the Dissent’s statement that the District Court has 
already determined that “‘a reasonable factfinder could not 
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determine that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to the 
risk of suicide,’” Dis. Op. at 18 (quoting JA at 15), is a red 
herring because that determination was made in reference to 
Count I of the third amended complaint, which alleged that 
Appellants were deliberately indifferent to Barkes’s serious 
medical needs as an individual. That is a very different claim 
than the supervisory liability claim contained in Count V and 
that we are allowing to proceed.  To the extent that Sample 
approved, in some circumstances, an objective test for 
determining a prison official’s Eighth Amendment deliberate 
indifference, that portion of Sample has been abrogated by 
Farmer and it is not the test we apply today. 
 Recognizing that our test does, in fact, require an 
official’s subjective deliberate indifference, the Dissent pivots 
and claims that the plaintiff must nonetheless plead that the 
supervisor was “personal[ly] involve[d] in his subordinates’ 
misfeasance.”  Dis. Op. at 9.  The Dissent’s rule would have 
the practical effect of requiring that a supervisor have 
personal knowledge of an individual inmate, that inmate’s 
particular serious medical need, and of the prison staff’s 
failure to treat that need, before the supervisor could ever be 
held liable for deliberate indifference.  But Farmer itself 
recognized that a prison official cannot avoid liability under 
the Eighth Amendment simply “by showing that, while he 
was aware of an obvious, substantial risk to inmate safety, he 
did not know that the complainant was especially likely to” 
suffer a constitutional injury.  511 U.S. at 843. 
The question under the Eighth 
Amendment is whether prison 
officials, acting with deliberate 
indifference, exposed a prisoner 
to a sufficiently substantial “risk 
of serious damage to his future 
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health,” and it does not matter 
whether the risk comes from a 
single source or multiple sources, 
any more than it matters whether 
a prisoner faces an excessive risk 
of attack for reasons personal to 
him or because all prisoners in his 
situation face such a risk.  If, for 
example, prison officials were 
aware that inmate “rape was so 
common and uncontrolled that 
some potential victims dared not 
sleep [but] instead . . . would 
leave their beds and spend the 
night clinging to the bars nearest 
the guards’ station,” it would 
obviously be irrelevant to liability 
that the officials could not guess 
beforehand precisely who would 
attack whom. 
Id. at 843-44 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Helling v. 
McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33, 35 (1993); Hutto v. Finley, 437 
U.S. 678, 681-82 n.3 (1978)).  A high-ranking prison official 
can expose an inmate to danger by failing to correct serious 
known deficiencies in the provision of medical care to the 
inmate population.  That the official had no specific 
knowledge of any particular inmate or the failure of 
subordinate officials to treat that inmate’s serious medical 
condition is irrelevant. 
 The Dissent suggests that Nelson v. Correctional 
Medical Services, 583 F.3d 522 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc), 
contradicts our analysis, but in fact that case supports our 
position.  There, an inmate sued a guard and a prison director 
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under the Eighth Amendment because her legs had been 
shackled during labor, causing her injury.  Id. at 525-27.  She 
alleged that the prison director had violated her rights “by 
failing to ensure that proper policies and customs were 
implemented with respect to the restraint of female inmates in 
labor.”  Id. at 534-35.  The Eighth Circuit stated that the 
director could be liable “if he personally displayed deliberate 
indifference to the hazards and pain resulting from shackling 
an inmate such as [the plaintiff] during the final stages of 
labor.”9  Id. (emphasis added) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 
842).  The court then engaged in a lengthy analysis of the 
policies and procedures in place at the time, and concluded 
that they “suggest[ed] administrative concern for the health 
and safety of pregnant inmates.”  Id. at 536.  Under the Eighth 
Circuit’s analysis, the outcome would have been different had 
the policies and procedures in place been constitutionally 
inadequate and had there been evidence of the prison 
director’s deliberate indifference to that fact.  Nelson’s 
analysis also suggests that the director could have been held 
liable if, notwithstanding the adequacy of the policies, he had 
been deliberately indifferent to a widespread failure to 
properly implement the policies.  See id. at 536 (recognizing 
the adequacy of the policies and stating that “[w]ithout 
further allegation or evidence of deliberate indifference,” the 
Eighth Amendment claim must fail (emphasis added)).  The 
latter situation is analogous to that before us today. 
                                              
9
 Contrary to the Dissent’s implication, see Dis. Op. at 
13, the prison director’s lack of personal knowledge of the 
plaintiff and his absence at her delivery were merely 
undisputed facts in the case.  Nelson, 583 F.3d at 535.  No 
part of the court’s analysis turned on these facts. 
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 What the Dissent fundamentally fails to recognize is 
that there are different ways that prison officials can be 
responsible for causing an inmate harm.  Dissenting in Vance, 
Judge Hamilton adroitly provided the following hypothetical: 
“[S]uppose . . . that a local police 
chief or even the FBI director 
issued a policy that authorized the 
use of deadly force against any 
fleeing subject. The policy itself 
would be unconstitutional under 
Tennessee v. Garner[, 471 U.S. 1 
(1985)]. The chief or director who 
authorized that unconstitutional 
use of force could certainly be 
held personally responsible under 
section 1983 or Bivens to a person 
shot by an officer following the 
policy.   
 
Vance, 701 F.3d at 223 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).  No less 
here, where there is evidence of serious inadequacies in the 
provision of adequate medical care for inmates, and there is 
evidence that prison officials were aware of the problem and 
yet indifferent to the risk that an inmate would suffer a 
constitutional injury, they can be held liable under § 1983 for 
violating the Eighth Amendment 
iii. 
 Our final point of disagreement with the Dissent is in 
his articulation of the deliberate indifference standard itself.  
The Dissent claims that we err in failing to apply an 
“intentional version of deliberate indifference.”  Dis. Op. at 
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19.  But his formulation of deliberate indifference is entirely 
inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent. 
 We derive the test for establishing Eighth Amendment 
deliberate indifference from Sample and from the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Farmer.  While the Dissent is correct that 
Appellees do not allege that Appellants took an intentional act 
to cause inadequate medical care for inmates, this is a straw-
man argument because under Farmer they are not required to 
make that allegation.  Farmer stated that although “deliberate 
indifference entails something more than mere negligence, 
the cases are also clear that it is satisfied by something less 
than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm 
or with knowledge that harm will result.”  511 U.S. at 835.  
Deliberate indifference falls “somewhere between the poles 
of negligence at one end and purpose or knowledge at the 
other.”  Id. at 836.  “[A]n Eighth Amendment claimant need 
not show that a prison official acted or failed to act believing 
that harm actually would befall an inmate; it is enough that 
the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a 
substantial risk of serious harm.”  As we will discuss infra, 
there remains a genuine dispute of material fact over whether 
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Appellants displayed deliberate indifference under this 
standard.
10
 
B. 
 “Qualified immunity shields government officials from 
civil damages liability unless the official violated a statutory 
or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time 
of the challenged conduct.”  Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 
2088, 2093 (2012).  The qualified immunity analysis is thus 
composed of two constituent questions: first, whether the 
plaintiff suffered a deprivation of a constitutional or statutory 
right; and second, if so, whether that right was “clearly 
established” at the time of the alleged misconduct.  If the 
answer to either question is “no,” qualified immunity applies.  
                                              
10
 The Dissent draws its “intentional” deliberate 
indifference test from Vance.  Vance stated, in discussing 
supervisory liability post-Iqbal, that “[d]eliberate indifference 
to a known risk is a form of intent,” but that in order “to show 
scienter by the deliberate-indifference route, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the public official knew of risks with 
sufficient specificity to allow an inference that inaction is 
designed to produce or allow harm.”  701 F.3d at 204.  We 
think Vance is distinguishable because that case did not 
consider an Eighth Amendment claim.  Before reaching the 
question of supervisory liability, the Seventh Circuit 
considered whether it would recognize a new Bivens remedy 
against military personnel who mistreat detainees in violation 
of the Detainee Treatment Act, 10 U.S.C. § 801 note and 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000dd to 2000dd-1, and potentially one or more 
treaties.  702 F.3d at 198.  The allegation involved violation 
of a federal statutory right rather than the Eighth Amendment, 
and so the mental state need not have matched that which we 
apply today. 
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Id.  Deciding which question to address first is within the 
Court’s sound discretion.  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 
236 (2009).   
1. 
 A right is “clearly established” if, at the time of the 
alleged deprivation, “‘[t]he contours of [the] right [are] 
sufficiently clear’ that every ‘reasonable official would have 
understood that what he is doing violates that right.’”  al-
Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2083 (second alteration in original) 
(quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).  
Crucial to the “clearly established” inquiry is the level of 
generality at which the right is defined.  A constitutional right 
is not “clearly established simply because of the existence of 
a broad imperative like the one against ‘unreasonable . . . 
seizures,’”  Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313, 329 (3d Cir. 
2011), but nor must there be “a case directly on point [if] 
existing precedent . . . [has] placed the statutory or 
constitutional question beyond debate,”  al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 
2083 (citing Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640).  Rather, the asserted 
right must be sufficiently bounded that it gives “practical 
guidance” to officials on the ground.  See John C. Jeffries, Jr., 
What’s Wrong with Qualified Immunity?, 62 Fla. L. Rev. 851, 
854 (2010).  Put another way, the right asserted cannot be so 
abstract that any transgression violates a clearly established 
right, thereby evaporating “the balance . . . between the 
interests in vindication of citizens’ constitutional rights and in 
public officials’ effective performance of their duties.”  
Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195 (1984)).  The 
“ultimate question” in the qualified immunity analysis “is 
whether the defendant had ‘“fair warning” that his conduct 
deprived his victim of a constitutional right.’”  Schneyder, 
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653 F.3d at 329 (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 740 
(2002)). 
 The “clearly established” game is won or lost on how 
broadly or narrowly one defines the right at issue.  Appellants 
attempt to atomize the asserted right into oblivion by defining 
it narrowly as an inmate’s right to “supervision of the medical 
vendor by the prison administrators,”  for which they assert 
that “[t]here is no case law establishing that a government 
entity is responsible for monitoring a medical provider under 
Section 1983.”  Appellants’ Br. at 19.  There are two 
problems with this characterization.  First, its myopia runs 
directly contrary to the Supreme Court’s oft-repeated 
admonition that “a case directly on point” is not required for a 
right to be clearly established.  See al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 
2083.  Second, this argument hinges entirely on the 
outsourcing of prison medical care to a private, third-party 
provider.  Appellants do not argue that they have no 
responsibility to supervise state-employed correctional staff 
such as guards, or that they would have no responsibility to 
supervise the medical staff were it composed of state 
employees rather than private contractors.  Rather, their 
argument depends entirely on the Court finding that there is a 
difference of constitutional import between the two.  No 
reasonable prison administrator could believe that hiring a 
private contractor to provide a constitutionally required 
service would allow them to abdicate their constitutional 
supervisory duties.  Yet, culled to its essence, that is 
Appellants’ argument. 
 Even if we were to accept the manner in which 
Appellants would particularize the asserted right, they have 
nonetheless failed to show a lack of clarity in the law.  They 
rely on our decision in Spruill v. Gillis, in which an inmate in 
a Pennsylvania prison brought a § 1983 claim against, among 
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other individuals, the Unit Manager of the Restricted Housing 
Unit, alleging that as a result of his deliberate indifference the 
plaintiff was injured by an untreated or inadequately treated 
back problem.  372 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2004).  In 
affirming dismissal of the complaint against the non-medical 
official for failure to state a claim, we held: 
If a prisoner is under the care of medical experts 
. . . , a non-medical prison official will generally 
be justified in believing that the prisoner is in 
capable hands.  This follows naturally from the 
division of labor within a prison.  Inmate health 
and safety is promoted by dividing 
responsibility for various aspects of inmate life 
among guards, administrators, physicians, and 
so on.  Holding a non-medical prison official 
liable in a case where a prisoner was under a 
physician’s care would strain this division of 
labor.  Moreover, under such a regime, non-
medical officials could even have a perverse 
incentive not to delegate treatment 
responsibility to the very physicians most likely 
to be able to help prisoners, for fear of vicarious 
liability. 
Id. at 236.   
 Appellants rely on this language to argue that, at the 
time of Barkes’s suicide, it was not clearly established that 
they, as non-medical prison administrators, had a  
constitutional supervisory duty over the medical staff.  But in 
the very next line of Spruill we stated that “absent a reason to 
believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their 
assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, a non-
medical prison official . . . will not be chargeable with the 
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Eighth Amendment scienter requirement of deliberate 
indifference.”  Id.  Dismissal was proper in Spruill because 
the plaintiff had failed to plead facts suggesting that the 
official was aware of the alleged inadequacies in medical 
care, not because prison administrators are categorically 
exempt from a supervisory role over medical personnel.  Id. 
at 236-37 & n.12.  And moreover, there is nothing in Spruill 
supporting Appellants’ contention that there is a difference of 
constitutional import between state-employed and privately 
contracted medical staff.  Appellants’ argument that the law 
was hazy with respect to their supervisory duty over prison 
medical staff is thus belied by the very case upon which they 
rely.  See Appellants’ Br. at 20 (conceding that Spruill was 
“[t]he clearly established” law at the pertinent time).11 
 With that said, we think that the right Appellees assert, 
properly defined, is this: an incarcerated person’s right to the 
proper implementation of adequate suicide prevention 
protocols.
12
  This right is clearly established in our case law, 
and was so at the time of Barkes’s suicide.  It is beyond 
                                              
11
 The Dissent asserts that we have not “address[ed] Taylor 
and Williams’s argument that there is no clearly established 
right to supervision over those charged with implementing 
suicide prevention protocols.”  Dis. Op. at 24-25.  This is a 
puzzling disagreement because, as previously demonstrated, 
we have discussed and rejected their attempt to characterize 
the right in such a manner, and noted that, even were we to 
accept it, Spruill forecloses their argument. 
12
 The District Court defined the pertinent right as Barkes’s 
“constitutional right to adequate medical care.”  JA at 21.  
While we agree with the District Court’s ultimate ruling on 
qualified immunity, we think that this characterization fails to 
sufficiently particularize the asserted right. 
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dispute that the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the 
Eighth Amendment, incorporated by virtue of the Fourteenth, 
obliges the States to provide adequate medical care for the 
incarcerated.  See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104.  This is so because 
“[p]risoners retain the essence of human dignity inherent in 
all persons.”  Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011).  
Prisoners, because of their incarceration, have lost the means 
to provide for themselves, and therefore the prisons that 
house them are constitutionally bound to provide sustenance 
and adequate physical and mental health care.  Id. 
 At the time of Barkes’s suicide, we had long 
recognized that an inmate’s “particular vulnerability to 
suicide” is a serious medical need that prison officials may 
not recklessly disregard.  Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 838 
F.2d 663, 669 (3d Cir. 1988) (Colburn I), abrogated on other 
grounds by Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics 
Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993).  In 
Colburn I, we examined for the first time whether a prisoner’s 
suicide can give rise to liability under § 1983.  We began by 
examining cases in which the plaintiff was the victim of 
violence by persons other than the defendant-officials, and 
drew from that precedent the conclusion that “where prison 
officials infringed a liberty interest by intentional conduct, 
gross negligence, or reckless indifference, or an established 
state procedure, the matter is actionable under section 1983.”  
Id. at 667-68 (citing Commonwealth Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Russell, 825 F.2d 12 (3d Cir. 1987); Davidson v. O’Lone, 752 
F.2d 817 (3d Cir. 1984) (en banc), aff’d sub nom. Davidson v. 
Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986)).  We saw “no reason not to 
apply a similar construction of section 1983 when the acts 
causing the injury are those of the prisoner herself.”  Id. at 
668. 
 We drew additional guidance from the Supreme 
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Court’s decision in Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984).  
See Colburn I, 838 F.2d at 668-69.  In Hudson, the Supreme 
Court approved of searches of inmates and their cells to 
discover contraband in order to not only prevent violence 
against correctional staff and other prisoners but also to 
prevent suicides.  Hudson, 468 U.S. at 526 (recognizing that 
suicide was a significant concern in correctional institutions).  
Finding particular significance in “the [Hudson] Court’s 
statement that prison administrators ‘are under an obligation 
to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the 
inmates themselves,’”  Colburn I, 838 F.2d at 668 (quoting 
Hudson, 468 U.S. at 526), we held that when custodial 
officials “know or should know of the particular vulnerability 
to suicide of an inmate, then the Fourteenth Amendment 
imposes on them an obligation not to act with reckless 
indifference to that vulnerability,” id. at 669.13   
                                              
13
 We also relied on the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Partridge 
v. Two Unknown Police Officers, 791 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 
1986).  Partridge was one of the first cases to extend the 
analysis of Estelle to prison suicide cases.  Writing for the 
Court, Judge Wisdom observed:  
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 We further elucidated this issue in Colburn v. Upper 
Darby Township, 946 F.2d 1017 (3d Cir. 1991) (Colburn II).  
In Colburn II, we explained that one of the principal 
“theoretical underpinnings” in Colburn I was the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Estelle, which established that prison 
administrators “violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription 
of cruel and unusual punishment when they exhibit 
‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of 
prisoners.’”  Id. at 1023 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104)).  
We reemphasized in Colburn II that a “particular 
vulnerability to suicide” is a serious medical need 
encompassed within the rule of Estelle.  Id.  (citing 
                                                                                                     
[The due process clause imposed on the 
custodial officials] a duty, at a minimum, not to 
be deliberately indifferent to Partridge's serious 
medical needs. A serious medical need may 
exist for psychological or psychiatric treatment, 
just as it may exist for physical ills. A 
psychological or psychiatric condition can be as 
serious as any physical pathology or injury, 
especially when it results in suicidal tendencies. 
And just as a failure to act to save a detainee 
from suffering from gangrene might violate the 
duty to provide reasonable medical care absent 
an intervening legitimate government objective, 
failure to take any steps to save a suicidal 
detainee from injuring himself may also 
constitute a due process violation . . . . 
 
Id. at 1187 (quoted in Colburn I, 838 F.2d at 669). 
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Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326 
(3d Cir. 1987)).
14
  
 This body of precedent places it “beyond debate,” al-
Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2083, that appropriate suicide-preventive 
measures are a required component of the Constitution’s 
command that prison administrators provide adequate mental 
and physical health care for inmates.  Our decision in Spruill 
gives “fair warning,” Schneyder, 653 F.3d at 329, that non-
medical prison officials may “be chargeable with the Eighth 
Amendment scienter requirement of deliberate indifference” 
when they possess actual knowledge or have reason to believe 
that prison medical staff are mistreating or failing to treat 
inmates’ serious medical conditions.  Spruill, 372 F.3d at 236.  
Accordingly, we hold that the right Appellees assert – an 
incarcerated person’s right to the proper implementation of 
                                              
14
 We note that the District Court cited Woloszyn v. County of 
Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir. 2005), in support of its 
holding that Barkes had alleged the violation of a clearly 
established right.  See JA at 19 n.5.  We reiterated in 
Woloszyn that a vulnerability to suicide is a serious medical 
need.  396 F.3d at 319-20.  However, Woloszyn post-dates 
Barkes’ 2004 death, and accordingly is not relevant for 
purposes of determining the state of the law at the pertinent 
time.  See Leveto v. Lapina, 258 F.3d 156, 162 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(“‘[I]n the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be 
apparent’” (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640)).  
Nonetheless, as we discuss above, our decisional law in place 
at the time of Barkes’ death suffices to meet the clearly 
established inquiry.  
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adequate suicide prevention protocols – was clearly 
established at the time of Barkes’s suicide.15 
2. 
 The first prong of the qualified immunity analysis 
(though we address it second here) asks whether the plaintiff 
suffered a deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right.  A 
finding of qualified immunity grants immunity not only from 
liability, but from the burdens of litigation itself.  We have 
recognized that “‘the determination of qualified immunity 
must be made at an early stage in the litigation’” – often in a 
pre-answer motion to dismiss.  See Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 
448, 461 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Vaughn v. U.S. Small Bus. 
Admin., 65 F.3d 1322, 1326 (6th Cir. 1995)).  We thus often 
analyze qualified immunity without the benefit of a factual 
record.  However, in this case Appellants asserted qualified 
immunity in a motion for summary judgment.  While “[t]he 
issue of qualified immunity is generally a question of law, . . .  
a genuine issue of material fact will preclude summary 
judgment on qualified immunity.”  Giles, 571 F.3d at 326 
(citing Deary v. Three Un-Named Police Officers, 746 F.2d 
                                              
15
 The Dissent makes one final objection to this analysis, 
claiming that by defining the right to include the “proper 
implementation” of suicide prevention protocols we have 
“plainly violate[d] the basic proposition that the Eighth 
Amendment does not impose liability for negligence.”  Dis. 
Op. at 26.  We have not.  Nothing in our definition of the 
right at issue – or in our opinion more broadly – remotely 
suggests that a mere negligent failure to properly implement 
suicide prevention protocols would be sufficient to trigger 
liability.  A recklessly indifferent failure to properly 
implement such protocols, however, may very well trigger 
Eighth Amendment liability.    
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185, 192 (3d Cir. 1984)).  Based upon our review of the 
summary judgment record, we find that there exist genuine 
disputes of material fact that preclude a finding of qualified 
immunity for Appellants.   
 As we noted previously, Sample’s four-part test 
provides the rubric for evaluating whether supervisors are 
liable under § 1983 for deliberate indifference.  See Whetzel, 
256 F.3d at 134-35.  To hold a supervisor liable for such an 
Eighth Amendment violation, the plaintiff must identify a 
supervisory policy or procedure that the supervisor defendant 
failed to implement, and prove that: (1) the policy or 
procedures in effect at the time of the alleged injury created 
an unreasonable risk of a constitutional violation; (2) the 
defendant-official was aware that the policy created an 
unreasonable risk; (3) the defendant was indifferent to that 
risk; and (4) the constitutional injury was caused by the 
failure to implement the supervisory procedure.  Brown, 269 
F.3d at 216 (discussing Sample).  The District Court found 
that disputed factual issues existed as to each of these four 
elements.  We agree with its analysis.   
 Appellees claim that Taylor and Williams should have 
enforced FCM’s compliance with their contractual 
obligations, specifically by requiring FCM to adhere to up-to-
date NCCHC standards, by properly administering the 
standards to which they adhered, and by requiring mental 
health screenings to have been conducted by a qualified 
mental health professional rather than an unqualified LPN, 
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thus satisfying Sample’s threshold requirement.16  Record 
evidence indicates a material factual dispute as to whether 
FCM’s suicide prevention procedures, coupled with DOC’s 
supervision of FCM (or lack thereof), created an unreasonable 
risk of a constitutional violation.  First, there is evidence that 
FCM’s suicide prevention screening practices were not in 
                                              
16
 In Count V of the third amended complaint, 
Appellees alleged that Taylor and Williams “failed to 
supervise and/or monitor the activities of FCM . . . including, 
but not limited to, the failure to insure the proper evaluation 
of [Barkes’s] psychological condition in light of his responses 
to intake inquiries advising of his prior suicide attempt, and 
the failure to insure that appropriate suicide-prevention 
observation of and/or restrictions upon Mr. Barkes occurred 
in the period prior to an evaluation by a fully qualified 
medical provider.”  JA at 170. They further alleged that “the 
intake form filled out by Mr. Barkes indicated a previous 
suicide attempt in December of 2003, and the presence of 
psychological problems and indications of his usage of 
psychotropic medication, yet he was not placed under 
heightened surveillance,” and that “the intake form, after 
having been filled out by Mr. Barkes, was reviewed only by 
an FCM licensed practical nurse prior to the assignment of 
Mr. Barkes to a virtually unsupervised booking and receiving 
area,” and that “the intake form on which so much reliance 
was placed by the DOC and FCM had been removed by the 
NCCHC from its 2003 ‘Standards for Health Services in 
Prisons’ because the NCCHC had found that prison 
administrators were relying too heavily on such forms instead 
of implementing the procedures described and recommended 
in the text of the ‘Standards for Health Services in Prisons.’”  
JA at 171. 
 48 
compliance with NCCHC standards, as required by their 
contract with the DOC, insofar as FCM was relying on out-
of-date NCCHC guidelines and failed even to properly 
implement the standards upon which it was relying.  
Specifically, the intake form administered to Barkes was 
designed to be used by a qualified mental health professional, 
but instead was administered by an unqualified LPN.  
Appellees claim that, had the proper procedures been 
followed, Barkes’s answer regarding a previous suicide 
attempt and his use of certain medications would have 
triggered a referral to a mental health professional.  While the 
NCCHC apparently accredited HRYCI about one year before 
Barkes’s death, that is simply one fact among many that the 
factfinder will have to consider.  Second, the evidence also 
suggests that FCM lacked access to Barkes’s probation 
records, and that if they had such access they would have 
been aware of his lengthy history of mental health problems 
and suicide attempts, and may have placed Barkes under 
heightened suicide prevention measures.  Third, there is 
evidence that FCM was intentionally short-staffing to drive 
up profits.  Fourth, evidence suggests that DOC’s dilatory 
manner of supervision allowed FCM’s provision of services 
to degrade.  Joyce Talley, the DOC official tasked with 
ensuring FCM’s compliance with the contract, did not assess 
FCM’s provision of medical care to the inmates,17 claimed 
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 See, e.g., JA at 367 (“Q: Did you make any assessments of 
the job they [FCM] were doing providing medical care for the 
inmates? A: I personally did not, no.”); id. (“Going back to 
my question regarding the assessment of the services 
provided by the independent vendor FCM, was there anyone 
from the Department of Correction who made any such 
assessment? A: There was no one that had the knowledge or 
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that it was not her responsibility to ensure FCM’s compliance 
with NCCHC standards, and stated that she largely relied on 
FCM to police itself.
18
  Based on the record before us, a 
reasonable jury could find that FCM’s policies and 
procedures in place at the time of Barkes’s suicide created an 
unreasonable risk of a constitutional deprivation and that 
Appellants’ manner of supervising FCM further exacerbated 
the risk. 
 Appellants stated in deposition testimony that they 
knew that the quality of FCM’s provision of medical services 
was degrading, with both Appellants acknowledging 
awareness of intentional short-staffing and Williams 
acknowledging awareness of FCM’s contractual non-
compliance with respect to implementing the document 
management computer system.  Taylor’s termination letter to 
FCM indicates his awareness of FCM’s gross contractual 
non-compliance.  A reasonable juror could draw from that 
evidence the conclusion that Appellants were aware of an 
unreasonable risk that FCM’s declining performance would 
result in a failure to treat or a mistreatment of an inmate’s 
serious medical condition.  A reasonable juror could also 
conclude that, by failing to enforce FCM’s compliance with 
NCCHC standards as required by their contract, Appellants 
                                                                                                     
the background within the department that could actually go 
out to see if the medical care was provided.”).   
18
 See JA at 366-67 (“Q: As in the other responsibilities, did 
you have any type of key managers? A: Within the medical? 
Q: Yes. A: No. It was – no. Q: How is it that you managed 
the health care issues for inmates? A: That would be working 
with the 
contracted vendor and through the MRC, the Medical Review 
Committee.”). 
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were deliberately indifferent to the risk that FCM’s flagging 
quality would result in a violation of an inmate’s 
constitutional rights. 
 Finally, a reasonable juror could find that Barkes’s 
suicide was caused by Appellants’ failures to supervise.  
Despite Barkes’s extensive history of mental health problems 
and multiple suicide attempts (including one at the very 
prison where he was being held, and two a mere 65 days 
before his death), the LPN who performed his intake did not 
place him on even the lowest level of suicide watch.  In 
Appellees’ view, had Appellants properly supervised FCM 
and ensured compliance with the contract, Barkes’s answers 
during his screening would have resulted in additional 
preventive measures being taken.  Of course, it is also true 
that Barkes did not self-report feelings of suicidal ideation, 
nor did he exhibit any outward signs of suicidality.  But this 
serves only to highlight the factual nature of this dispute, 
which neither we nor the District Court on summary 
judgment are in the position to resolve.   
 Based on our review of the summary judgment record, 
we conclude that there remain sufficient factual disputes to 
preclude a finding that Appellants are entitled to qualified 
immunity.   
IV. 
 For the reasons that we have discussed, Appellants are 
not entitled to qualified immunity.  Accordingly, we will 
affirm the District Court’s order and remand for trial.  
Karen Barkes, et al. v. First Correctional Medical Inc., et al. 
No. 12-3074 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Today the Court holds that two of the most senior 
executives in the Delaware prison system must stand trial for 
the suicide of Christopher Barkes. In my view, this decision is 
a classic case of holding supervisors vicariously liable, a 
practice the Supreme Court proscribed in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662 (2009). The majority accomplishes this feat by 
attempting to salvage the supervisory liability doctrine we 
created twenty years before Iqbal in Sample v. Diecks, 885 
F.2d 1099 (3d Cir. 1989). As I shall explain, Sample has been 
abrogated by Iqbal. And even assuming I am wrong about 
Sample’s abrogation, Defendants Taylor and Williams are 
still entitled to summary judgment because Barkes has not 
complied with Sample’s requirement that she identify a 
specific supervisory practice or procedure that they failed to 
employ. I respectfully dissent.  
I 
 Christopher Barkes arrived at the HRYCI around 2:45 
p.m. on Saturday, November 13, 2004, following his arrest by 
Wilmington Police for a probation violation. Normally, 
Barkes would have been taken promptly to the Violation of 
Probation Center in Sussex County. Because it was the 
weekend, however, the HRYCI held him as a courtesy 
because the DOC’s transportation department ran only on 
weekdays. The HRYCI booked and processed Barkes as it 
would any other inmate, but did not admit him; rather, it held 
him in the booking and receiving area.  
 2 
As part of Barkes’s intake, the DOC’s medical services 
contractor, First Correctional Medical, Inc. (FCM), conducted 
a standard medical screening. In doing so, FCM gathered 
Barkes’s medical history and checked his vitals and physical 
health. FCM also administered a mental health screening 
intended to, inter alia, prevent suicides. FCM’s suicide 
prevention screening test listed seventeen risk factors. Some 
of those factors automatically triggered suicide protection 
measures. For example, if an inmate appeared to be under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs and showed signs of withdrawal 
or mental illness, FCM would immediately initiate its suicide-
prevention protocols and notify a physician. Otherwise, FCM 
initiated its protocols if the inmate’s screening noted eight or 
more of the seventeen risk factors.
1
  
A licensed practical nurse employed by FCM 
conducted Barkes’s medical screening about fifteen minutes 
after his arrival. At that time, he did not appear depressed, 
anxious, afraid, or angry, and the arresting officers did not 
believe Barkes was a suicide risk. Barkes told the nurse that 
he was not thinking about killing himself. Barkes did admit to 
a prior suicide attempt in 2003, but he failed to disclose three 
other suicide attempts, one of which was just two months 
                                                 
1
 FCM modeled its suicide prevention screening form 
on a sample appended to the National Commission on 
Correctional Health Care’s (NCCHC) 1997 standards for 
prison health services. In 2003, the NCCHC published a new 
edition of its manual, but FCM continued using its form 
modeled on the 1997 manual. One year before Barkes’s 
suicide, the NCCHC accredited the HRYCI after reviewing 
FCM’s suicide prevention screening form.  
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prior to his booking at HRYCI. Based on Barkes’s responses 
during the screening, only two of the seventeen suicide risk 
factors were indicated: a psychiatric history and a suicide 
attempt.  
The HRYCI correctional staff monitored Barkes 
throughout Saturday night and Sunday morning. Officers 
delivered Barkes his breakfast at 8:00 a.m. He was lying 
awake on his bed when officers observed him at 10:45 a.m., 
10:50 a.m., and 11:00 a.m. Sometime between 11:00 a.m. and 
11:35 a.m. when they next checked on him, Barkes hanged 
himself. Officers immediately called FCM staff, who 
attempted to resuscitate Barkes.  
None of the officers watching Barkes noticed anything 
unusual about him.
2
 The only sign that he had been 
contemplating suicide came in a phone call Barkes made to 
his wife the night before his death, in which he told her: “I 
can’t live this way anymore.” Although Barkes’s wife 
testified that she interpreted this comment as a suicidal threat, 
she did not advise anyone at the HRYCI of this comment or 
otherwise alert them that her husband was in distress.  
II 
The claim at issue—that Barkes was subjected to cruel 
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment—is premised on the provision of constitutionally 
inadequate medical care by FCM. Specifically, Barkes 
                                                 
2
 Those same officers were not blind to inmates who 
turned suicidal. In fact, earlier on the same morning that 
Barkes died, they transferred a different inmate to the 
infirmary for suicide prevention.  
 4 
challenges the adequacy of the supervision of FCM’s medical 
staff at the HRYCI. Dr. Tammy Kastre, the President and 
CEO of FCM, supervised FCM’s medical staff at all of 
Delaware’s correctional facilities. The DOC’s Bureau of 
Management Services supervised FCM and Dr. Kastre. The 
head of that bureau, Joyce Talley, was the DOC’s liaison to 
FCM.
3
 Talley tasked her deputy chief, Kathy English, with 
some of the FCM oversight responsibilities. The formal 
responsibility for oversight over FCM’s compliance with its 
contract lay with the DOC’s Medical Review Committee, 
which Talley chaired and English co-chaired. Every month, 
the nine-member committee met with around four FCM 
representatives. The committee reviewed certain performance 
measures based on NCCHC standards, such as how long it 
took FCM to administer its health screening after new 
inmates were admitted. The committee also reviewed random 
chart audits. If the DOC had any concerns with FCM’s 
services, it raised them in those meetings.  
It is important to note that the liability of none of the 
persons or entities just mentioned is at issue in this appeal. 
Instead, Barkes seeks to hold two DOC executives liable: 
                                                 
3
 The majority contends that Talley “testified that she 
did not believe it to be her responsibility to ensure FCM’s 
compliance with NCCHC standards.” Maj. Transcript at 8–9. 
As Talley explained, she “managed the health care issues for 
inmates” by “working with the contracted vendor and through 
the [Medical Review Committee].” App. at 806. Any 
complaints about medical issues “would be presented to the 
MRC. It was as a group. We were a committee that would 
oversee the contract.” App. at 806.  
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Commissioner Stanley Taylor (Talley’s supervisor) and 
HRYCI Warden Raphael Williams (who was outside the 
chain of supervision over FCM).
4
 The parties agree that 
neither executive had any personal knowledge of Barkes 
before his death. In fact, Warden Williams was on vacation 
while Barkes was at the HRYCI. Commissioner Taylor was 
scarcely more involved in supervising FCM than Warden 
Williams; in fact, Delaware law empowered him to designate 
someone to administer the state’s medical services contract, 
and he appointed Talley to discharge that duty. See Del. Code 
tit.11, § 6517(12). The essence of Barkes’s claims against 
Taylor and Williams is that despite the fact that others were 
responsible for supervising FCM, “the buck stops” at the top.5  
                                                 
4
 FCM’s medical staff were not employees of the 
HRYCI and they did not report to Warden Williams. 
Williams’s “participation in health care” at the HRYCI was 
limited to “provid[ing] access, space, and security for 
[FCM’s] medical staff.” App. at 517. When Barkes’s lawyer 
asked Williams whether he “had any responsibilities for the 
adequate provision of health care to inmates,” he answered, 
“No. That was through management services. That’s where 
the responsibility lied.” App. at 517. Another time, Williams 
testified: “all those policies were by management services. 
They were tasked with ensuring that FCM followed through 
with their contractual obligations. That’s strictly through 
them.” App. at 792.  
 
5
 The majority states that “Taylor’s termination letter 
to FCM indicates his awareness of FCM’s gross contractual 
non-compliance,” and that “[a] reasonable juror could draw 
from that evidence the conclusion that Appellants were aware 
 6 
When Barkes’s widow filed this lawsuit6 in 2006, her 
complaint included two section 1983 claims against Taylor 
and Williams: (1) deliberate indifference to the conditions at 
the HRYCI; and (2) failure to supervise the DOC personnel 
and failure to institute appropriate procedures.
7
 United States 
District Court Judge Joseph Farnan granted Taylor and 
Williams summary judgment on both claims. Barkes’s 
deliberate indifference claim failed because she had not 
presented sufficient evidence of knowledge by Taylor and 
Williams of constitutionally inadequate medical conditions at 
the HRYCI. Her supervisory liability claim failed as a matter 
of law because she did not satisfy the threshold requirement 
for supervisory liability we established in Sample v. Diecks, 
885 F.2d 1099 (3d Cir. 1989), which requires a plaintiff to 
“identif[y] . . . a specific supervisory practice or procedure 
that [the supervisor] failed to employ.” Id. at 1118.  
                                                                                                             
of an unreasonable risk.” Maj. Transcript at 48. However, the 
District Court has already recognized that events occurring 
after Barkes’s death, such as Taylor’s 2005 letter terminating 
the DOC’s contract with FCM “cannot be probative of 
Commissioner Taylor’s or Warden William[s]’s awareness in 
2004 of a substantial risk.” App. at 83.  
 
6
 Plaintiffs are Barkes’s widow, Karen, both in her 
personal and representative capacity, as well as his two 
daughters. For ease of reference, I refer to Plaintiffs 
collectively as “Barkes.”  
 
7
 Not relevant to this appeal, the complaint also 
included a wrongful death claim against Taylor and Williams, 
upon which they were granted summary judgment.   
 7 
Several months after granting Taylor and Williams 
summary judgment, the District Court granted Barkes leave to 
file an amended complaint. The Court dismissed that first 
amended complaint for reprising the claims dismissed on 
summary judgment. Barkes filed a second amended 
complaint, which was dismissed for failure to state a claim.  
In 2010, following the retirement of Judge Farnan, 
Barkes’s case was reassigned to the Honorable Leonard Stark. 
Barkes filed a third amended complaint that again sought to 
hold Taylor and Williams liable under a theory of supervisory 
liability. Having already suffered a summary judgment on the 
claim that Taylor and Williams failed to supervise employees 
of the DOC, Barkes shifted gears to argue that they failed to 
supervise FCM. Once again, Taylor and Williams sought 
summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity for the first 
time. Barkes also filed a motion for summary judgment. 
Before deciding the parties’ summary judgment 
motions, Judge Stark addressed Barkes’s separate motion to 
vacate the 2006 summary judgment and revive the Eighth 
Amendment and supervisory liability claims upon which 
Taylor and Williams had prevailed in 2006 before Judge 
Farnan. With respect to Barkes’s Eighth Amendment claim, 
the District Court held:  
Assuming, as Plaintiffs appear to argue, that 
deliberate indifference . . . can be shown by 
Defendants’ deliberate indifference to the 
medical needs of prisoners such as Barkes 
himself . . . the Court nonetheless concludes 
that nothing alters the prior conclusions: a 
reasonable factfinder could not determine that 
 8 
Defendants were deliberately indifferent to the 
risk of suicide. 
App. at 15. The District Court also upheld the 2006 summary 
judgment on Barkes’s supervisory liability claim for failure to 
supervise DOC personnel and failure to institute appropriate 
suicide prevention policies, concluding: “even assuming that 
the existing policy created an unreasonable risk of Eighth 
Amendment injury, there is still not sufficient evidence in the 
record from which a reasonable factfinder would conclude 
that Defendants were aware such an unreasonable risk was 
created and were indifferent to that risk.” App. at 16.  
After upholding the 2006 summary judgment for want 
of evidence that Taylor and Williams were aware of and 
indifferent to an unreasonable risk of suicide, the District 
Court denied their motion for summary judgment on Barkes’s 
claim that they failed to supervise FCM. In doing so, as the 
majority implicitly acknowledges, see Maj. Typescript at 18, 
the District Court erred in its application of Sample by failing 
to require Barkes to “identif[y] . . . a specific supervisory 
practice or procedure that [the supervisor] failed to employ.” 
Sample, 885 F.2d at 1118. That is a significant oversight, as 
this was the decisive element for Judge Farnan in deciding the 
earlier supervisory liability claim. Taylor and Williams now 
appeal that ruling, claiming qualified immunity because 
Barkes did not allege a legally cognizable supervisory 
liability claim against them and that such a right was not 
clearly established.  
 
 
 9 
III 
A 
 I begin with the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), which altered the legal 
landscape regarding supervisory liability. Iqbal sued U.S. 
Attorney General John Ashcroft and F.B.I. Director Robert 
Mueller, alleging that the conditions of his detention violated 
his constitutional rights. Iqbal claimed that Ashcroft and 
Mueller were “liable for knowledge and acquiescence in their 
subordinates’ use of discriminatory criteria to make 
classification decisions among detainees.” Id. at 677 (internal 
quotation marks deleted). “That is to say, [Iqbal] believe[d] a 
supervisor’s mere knowledge of his subordinate’s 
[unconstitutional] discriminatory purpose amounts to the 
supervisor’s violating the Constitution.” Id. The Court 
“reject[ed] [the] argument,” ruling that “a plaintiff must plead 
that each Government-official defendant, through the 
official’s own individual actions, has violated the 
Constitution.” Id. at 676–77. The Court continued: “In a 
§ 1983 suit or a Bivens action—where masters do not answer 
for the torts of their servants—the term ‘supervisory liability’ 
is a misnomer. Absent vicarious liability, each Government 
official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his 
or her own misconduct.” Id. at 677. 
Since Iqbal, supervisory liability claims must spring 
from “actions” or “misconduct,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676, 677; 
the mere fact that the supervisor occupied a position of 
authority is insufficient. Accordingly, the overwhelming 
weight of authority requires plaintiffs to establish the 
supervisor’s personal involvement in his subordinates’ 
misfeasance. See Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 
 10 
2012) (en banc); Carnaby v. City of Houston, 636 F.3d 183, 
189 (5th Cir. 2011); Porro v. Barnes, 624 F.3d 1322 (10th 
Cir. 2010); Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., 583 F.3d 522 (8th 
Cir. 2009) (en banc). But see Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202 
(9th Cir. 2011) (upholding failure to supervise claim when 
supervisor was not personally involved, but bore statutory 
responsibility for plaintiff’s injury). The courts of appeals 
requiring the supervisor’s personal involvement—i.e., the 
Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits—have upheld 
supervisory liability claims when the challenged policy 
originates with the supervisor or he contributes to its 
unlawfulness. See, e.g., Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 
1190 (10th Cir. 2010) (challenging sheriff’s accession to 
unlawful policy of denying bond after hours); T.E. v. Grindle, 
599 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2010) (challenging school principal’s 
active concealment of abuse reports). None of those courts of 
appeals has upheld a so-called “failure-to” claim, in which 
subordinates violate the law while the supervisor fails to take 
remedial action.  
Decisions of both the Seventh and Tenth Circuits 
illustrate the fundamental dichotomy between cases involving 
the supervisors’ personal involvement on the one hand and 
those relying on the supervisor’s position of authority. For 
example, the Seventh Circuit upheld a supervisory liability 
claim in T.E. v. Grindle, 599 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2010), when 
the plaintiffs “allege[d] that [the principal was] liable for 
actively concealing reports of abuse and creating an 
atmosphere that allowed abuse to flourish. In other words, 
they argue[d] that [the principal’s] own actions deprived them 
of their constitutional right.” Grindle, 599 F.3d at 590 
 11 
(emphasis added).
8
 Significantly, the plaintiffs’ theory did not 
rely on the “mere failure of supervisory officials to act.” Id. 
The allegations survived Iqbal “[b]ecause plaintiffs seek to do 
no more than hold [the principal] liable ‘for . . . her own 
misconduct.’” Id. (quoting Iqbal). 
Two years after Grindle was decided, the Seventh 
Circuit, sitting en banc, confronted a failure-to-supervise 
claim in Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012) (en 
banc). Vance sued Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, 
alleging that “[Secretary Rumsfeld] received reports that his 
subordinates sometimes [unlawfully] used [harsh 
interrogation] techniques . . . and . . . he did not do enough to 
bring interrogators under control.” Id. at 203. The Seventh 
Circuit recognized that after Iqbal, “[t]he supervisor can be 
liable only if he wants the unconstitutional or illegal conduct 
to occur.” Id. For Vance’s deliberate indifference claim, that 
meant he “would need to allege that Rumsfeld knew of a 
substantial risk to security contractors’ employees, and 
ignored that risk because he wanted plaintiffs (or similarly 
situated persons) to be harmed.” Id. at 204. This was because, 
absent that showing, supervisory liability claims become 
claims for vicarious liability. Id. “The head of any large 
bureaucracy receives reports of misconduct. . . . But heads of 
organizations have never been held liable on the theory that 
they did not do enough to combat subordinates’ misconduct, 
and the Supreme Court made it clear in Iqbal that such 
theories of liability are unavailing.” Id. at 204–05. For these 
                                                 
8
 Contrary to the majority’s view of the case, the 
Grindle plaintiffs alleged much more than that the supervisor-
principal “allow[ed] a subordinate teacher to continue 
working.” Maj. Typescript at 23. 
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reasons, the Seventh Circuit granted Secretary Rumsfeld 
qualified immunity.
9
  
                                                 
9
 The majority distinguishes Vance on the basis that 
Secretary Rumsfeld’s subordinates violated a federal statute 
instead of the Eighth Amendment. Although it is true that 
Vance did not involve an Eighth Amendment claim, its 
analysis on this point relied exclusively on Eighth 
Amendment case law. It goes without saying that if both a 
federal statute and the Eighth Amendment embrace the same 
state of mind, the analysis is identical. The majority and 
Vance both apply Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), a 
fact obscured by the majority’s removal of “But Farmer v. 
Brennan, holds that” in quoting Vance. See Maj. Typescript at 
36 n.10. Vance’s unaltered text explains: 
 
The supervisor must want the forbidden 
outcome to occur. Deliberate indifference to a 
known risk is a form of intent. But Farmer v. 
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), holds that, to 
show scienter by the deliberate-indifference 
route, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the 
public official knew of risks with sufficient 
specificity to allow an inference that inaction is 
designed to produce or allow harm. 
 
701 F.3d at 204. One sentence later, the court restated its 
reliance on Farmer: 
 
Prisons are dangerous places, and misconduct 
by both prisoners and guards is common. 
Liability for wardens would be purely vicarious. 
 13 
Like the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Grindle, the 
Tenth Circuit’s decision in Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 
1185 (10th Cir. 2010), did not involve a “failure-to” claim. 
That case involved a sheriff who violated a state law 
requiring sheriffs to accept bonds for “persons jailed at times 
other than the normal working hours.” Id. at 1190. The sheriff 
acceded to a county clerk’s non-binding policy of forbidding 
persons charged with felonies from posting bond after hours. 
Id. The Tenth Circuit held that Iqbal limited section 1983 
liability to “defendants whose own individual actions cause a 
constitutional deprivation because it requires plaintiffs prove 
each defendant took some act with the constitutionally 
applicable state of mind that caused the alleged constitutional 
violation.” Id. at 1200 (emphasis added). It upheld the claim 
because the plaintiff “presented facts that establish personal 
involvement” by “show[ing] [the sheriff] may have played 
more than a passive role in the alleged constitutional 
                                                                                                             
Farmer rejected a contention that wardens (or 
guards) can be liable just because they know 
that violence occurs in prisons and don't do 
more to prevent it on an institution-wide basis. 
To get anywhere, [plaintiffs] would need to 
allege that Rumsfeld knew of a substantial risk 
to security contractors’ employees, and ignored 
that risk because he wanted plaintiffs (or 
similarly situated persons) to be harmed. 
 
701 F.3d at 204.  
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violation—he may have deliberately enforced or actively 
maintained the policies in question at the jail.” Id. at 1204.10  
Unlike the direct involvement alleged in Dodds, the 
Tenth Circuit was presented with a failure-to-supervise claim 
in Porro v. Barnes, 624 F.3d 1322 (10th Cir. 2010). There, an 
                                                 
10
 The majority warns that this “rule would have the 
practical effect of requiring that a supervisor have personal 
knowledge of an individual inmate, that inmate’s particular 
serious medical need, and of the prison staff’s failure to treat 
that need,” Maj. Transcript at 32. In fact, Dodds demonstrates 
the incorrectness of the majority’s  supposition because there 
the “Plaintiff [did] not allege [the Supervisor-]Defendant was 
one of the jail employees who told him and the individuals 
who inquired about posting bail on his behalf that he could 
not post the bail . . . . Nor [did the] Plaintiff contend [the 
Supervisor-]Defendant personally instructed those employees 
to refuse to accept bail from [the] Plaintiff.” Dodds, 614 F.3d 
at 1194. 
 
Separately, the majority attacks this rule with a 
hypothetical from Judge Hamilton’s dissent from Vance in 
which “a local police chief or even the FBI director issued a 
policy that authorized the use of deadly force,” which policy 
“would be clearly unconstitutional.” Maj. Transcript at 34 
(quoting Vance, 701 F.3d at 223 (Hamilton, J., dissenting)). 
This hypothetical clearly survives Dodds because the policy’s 
unconstitutional quality originates with the supervisor. Judge 
Hamilton’s hypothetical is poles apart from Barkes’s 
complaint, which alleges FCM’s policies—not the DOC’s—
caused the HRYCI’s healthcare to deteriorate below the 
constitutional minimum.  
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inmate who was tasered three times by correctional officers 
brought a supervisory liability action against the county 
sheriff. Id. at 1324–25. The sheriff did not approve the 
tasering and was not present when it occurred. Id. at 1327. 
Consistent with Dodds, the Tenth Circuit held that “[t]o 
establish a violation of § 1983 by a supervisor, as with 
everyone else, then, the plaintiff must establish a deliberate, 
intentional act on the part of the defendant to violate the 
plaintiff’s legal rights.” Id. at 1327–28 (quotations and 
alterations omitted) (emphasis added); see also Dodds, 614 
F.3d at 1195 (“[T]he plaintiff must establish a deliberate, 
intentional act by the supervisor to violate constitutional 
rights.”). The court rejected the claim against the sheriff 
“because there [was] no evidence of his direct personal 
responsibility for the force used.” Id. at 1326 (emphasis in 
original). 
Like the Seventh and Tenth Circuits, the Fifth and 
Eighth Circuits have rejected similar “failure-to” claims after 
Iqbal. In Nelson v. Correctional Medical Services, 583 F.3d 
522 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc), a prison guard shackled the 
plaintiff’s legs during labor, causing permanent injuries while 
she gave birth. The plaintiff sued the director of the Arkansas 
Department of Correction, for “[failure] to ensure that proper 
policies and customs were implemented with respect to the 
restraint of female inmates in labor.” Id. at 527. Sitting en 
banc, the Eighth Circuit held that under Iqbal a supervisor is 
“liable only if he personally displayed deliberate indifference 
to the hazards and pain resulting from shackling an inmate 
such as [Plaintiff] during the final stages of labor.” Id. at 535 
 16 
(emphasis added).
11
 The court confined its analysis to the 
polices actually promulgated by the Department of Correction 
under the director’s watch, concluding that the policies 
showed “administrative concern for the health and safety of 
pregnant inmates.” Id. at 536.12  Noting the absence of the 
commissioner’s “personal involvement,” the Eighth Circuit 
granted qualified immunity. Id. On this point, the en banc 
court was unanimous. Id. at 536 (Riley, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). The Fifth Circuit has likewise 
narrowed supervisory liability to conform to Iqbal: “Beyond 
[the supervisor’s] own conduct, the extent of his liability as a 
supervisor is similar to that of a municipality that implements 
                                                 
11
 The Eighth Circuit reiterated this point in Whitson v. 
Stone County Jail, 602 F.3d 920 (8th Cir. 2010), when it 
stated that prison supervisors can be liable on an Eighth 
Amendment claim “only if they personally displayed 
deliberate indifference to the risk” of a constitutional 
deprivation. Id. at 927–28.  
 
12
 Just as Nelson approved of the Arkansas Department 
of Correction’s policies expressed in its regulations, we 
would not hesitate to approve of the Delaware Department of 
Correction’s policy expressed in its contract that requires 
FCM “to implement ‘Best Practices’ from State Correctional 
Services” for mental health care if Barkes challenged the 
DOC’s policies. App. at 138. That analysis is unnecessary, 
however, because Barkes does not challenge the DOC’s 
policies. 
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an unconstitutional policy.” Carnaby v. City of Houston, 636 
F.3d 183, 189 (5th Cir. 2011).
13
 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 
580 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2009), overruled on other grounds, 
131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011), aligns with these authorities. In that 
case, the government detained the plaintiff under the authority 
of the federal material witness statute and held him for 
suspected terrorist activity. The plaintiff brought a 
supervisory liability action against Attorney General John 
Ashcroft alleging two violations of the law. First, that 
Ashcroft “purposefully used the material witness statute” to 
unlawfully detain persons and that Ashcroft “designed and 
implemented” this policy. Id. at 957, 976. 14  That claim 
                                                 
13
 The First Circuit’s pre-Iqbal case law already 
required “an affirmative link between the behavior of a 
subordinate and the action or inaction of his supervisor . . . 
such that the supervisor’s conduct led inexorably to the 
constitutional violation.” Soto-Torres v. Fraticelli, 654 F.3d 
153, 158 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Pineda v. Toomey, 533 F.3d 
50, 54 (1st Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 49 (1st Cir. 
2009) (quoting Camilo-Robles v. Zapata, 175 F.3d 41, 44 (1st 
Cir. 1999)). Whether this standard satisfies Iqbal remains a 
question of first impression for the First Circuit, however. 
Soto-Torres, 654 F.3d at 158 n.7; Maldonado v. Fontanes, 
568 F.3d 263, 274 n.7 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 
14
 The majority reads Al-Kidd as “suggest[ing] that 
under Iqbal the United States Attorney General could be 
liable for knowingly ‘fail[ing] to act in the light of even 
unauthorized abuses.’” Maj. Typescript at 21. In fact, the 
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survived Ashcroft’s qualified immunity defense because, 
“unlike in Iqbal, these [were] not bare allegations that the 
Attorney General ‘knew of’ the policy. Here, the complaint 
contain[ed] allegations that plausibly suggest that Ashcroft 
purposely instructed his subordinates to bypass the plain 
reading of the statute.” Id. at 976. The second supervisory 
liability claim sought to hold Ashcroft liable for subjecting 
the plaintiff to “unreasonably punitive conditions of 
confinement” during his detention. Id. at 957. The Ninth 
Circuit granted Ashcroft qualified immunity on this claim 
because “the complaint [did] not allege any specific facts—
such as statements from Ashcroft or from high ranking 
officials in the DOJ—establishing that Ashcroft had personal 
involvement in setting the conditions of confinement.” Id. at 
978. Neither claim required the court to decide whether the 
“knowing failure to act standard” survived Iqbal, and it 
reserved judgment on that question. Id. at 976 n.25.
15
  
                                                                                                             
Ninth Circuit took pains to ensure that its decision was not 
read for that proposition: “We need not address whether [the 
‘knowing failure to act’ standard survived Iqbal] because al-
Kidd plausibly pleads ‘purpose’ rather than just ‘knowledge’ 
to impose liability on Ashcroft.” Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 
F.3d 949, 976 n.25 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 
15
 Although the Al-Kidd majority explained that its 
decision relied on the plaintiff’s pleadings of purpose and not 
a failure to act, Judge Bea perceived otherwise and dissented 
from the decision on this point, saying “it is doubtful that the 
majority’s knowing failure to act standard survived Iqbal.” 
580 F.3d at 992 n.13 (Bea, J., dissenting).  
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When the Ninth Circuit faced a “failure-to” claim in 
Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2011), it departed from 
the approaches taken by the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth 
Circuits. Contrary to the other four courts of appeals, the 
Ninth Circuit upheld an Eighth Amendment supervisory 
liability claim against a sheriff “because he knew or should 
have known about the dangers in the [jail], and . . . was 
deliberately indifferent to those dangers.” Id. at 1204–05. The 
plaintiff’s complaint contained detailed allegations 
concerning the sheriff’s knowledge of his subordinates’ 
unlawfulness.
16
 In determining the sheriff’s culpability for his 
                                                 
16
 It is worth noting that Barkes’s allegations of 
knowledge by Taylor and Williams come nowhere near the 
facts averred by the Starr plaintiff:  
 
Starr specifically alleges numerous incidents in 
which inmates in Los Angeles County jails have 
been killed or injured because of the culpable 
actions of the subordinates of Sheriff Baca. The 
complaint specifically alleges that Sheriff Baca 
was given notice of all of these incidents. It 
specifically alleges, in addition, that Sheriff 
Baca was given notice, in several reports, of 
systematic problems in the county jails under 
his supervision that have resulted in these 
deaths and injuries.  
 
652 F.3d at 1216. On the question of knowledge, Barkes 
alleges merely that Taylor and Williams “were aware that the 
suicide rate in Delaware prisons was above the national 
average,” that they knew “jailed detainees have a higher 
incidence of suicide than incarcerated inmates” but “there 
 20 
inaction, however, the Court permitted the claim to go 
forward because a state statute held the sheriff “answerable 
for the prisoner’s safekeeping.” Id. at 1208. In a vigorous 
dissent, Judge Trott claimed that the “complaint has all the 
hallmarks of an attempted end run around the prohibition 
against using the vicarious liability doctrine of respondeat 
superior to get at the boss.” Id. at 1217 (Trott, J., dissenting). 
In his view, “simply alleging generally that the Sheriff is 
answerable for the prisoner’s safe-keeping doesn’t cut it.” 
Id.
17
 
 
                                                                                                             
was only one suicide prevention policy applicable to both,” 
and that both were “aware that the first twenty-four hours of a 
jailed detainee’s detention were a time of high-suicide risk.” 
App. at 171–72.  
 
17
 Although no statute holds Taylor and Williams 
responsible for medical conditions at the HRYCI, Judge 
Trott’s observations apply equally well to this appeal: 
 
Sadly, bad things routinely happen in the best of 
jails. The same is true of hospitals, armies, 
churches, nursing homes, synagogues, boy 
scout troops, and legislatures. To attach 
personal legal liability to the leaders of these 
organizations, however, requires much more 
than, “Well, she must have known and must 
have been deliberately indifferent, because after 
all, it happened on her watch.” 
 
Starr, 652 F.3d at 1219 (Trott, J., dissenting). 
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B 
Barkes’s allegations are inadequate under any of our 
sister circuits’ interpretations of Iqbal. Barkes argues that 
FCM acted unlawfully in providing medical care at the 
HRYCI, and she would hold Taylor and Williams liable 
because they allegedly knew that FCM provided 
constitutionally inadequate medical care and failed to cure 
FCM’s deficiencies. But nothing in the pleadings alleges that 
Taylor and Williams “personally displayed deliberate 
indifference,” Nelson, 585 F.3d at 535, committed a 
“deliberate, intentional act,” Porro, 624 F.3d at 1327–28; 
Dodds, 614 F.3d at 1195, or “wanted plaintiffs (or similarly 
situated persons) to be harmed.” Vance, 701 F.3d at 204. Nor 
does Barkes challenge any of the policies promulgated by the 
DOC. In fact, she does the opposite, citing with approval the 
DOC’s contract requiring FCM to use “[b]est [p]ractices” for 
mental health care as proof of wrongdoing. App. at 138. 
Barkes has alleged nothing beyond knowledge on the part of 
Taylor and Williams. She complains that Taylor spent “‘very 
little’ time on prison health care issues, delegating the 
responsibility to others.” App. at 172. But after Iqbal, that 
fact alone merits a dismissal because Barkes must establish 
that Taylor and Williams “played more than a passive role in 
the alleged constitutional violation.” Dodds, 614 F.3d at 
1204. Claims brought because—in Barkes’s words—the 
supervisor “presided over a system” fall well short of the 
standard established in Iqbal. App. at 745.  
Barkes’s claim fails even under the Ninth Circuit’s 
approach in Starr. That opinion applied a pure deliberate 
indifference standard without a personal involvement 
requirement. Unlike in Starr, here no statute holds either 
Commissioner Taylor or Warden Williams “answerable” for 
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medical care in Delaware prisons. In fact, a Delaware statute 
does the opposite insofar as it empowered Taylor to appoint a 
designee to administer the medical services contract. See Del. 
Code tit.11, § 6517(12). He did just that, charging the DOC’s 
bureau of management services with this duty. And as for 
Warden Williams, Barkes’s claim is completely unsupported 
because he had no supervisory authority over FCM. FCM 
“answer[ed]” to Talley, but not to Taylor or Williams. See 
Starr, 652 F.3d at 1208. Barkes might have a cognizable 
supervisory liability suit against Talley under Starr, but not 
against two senior executives who did not supervise FCM. 
Unsurprisingly, when both Judges Farnan and Stark viewed 
Barkes’s allegations through a pure deliberate indifference 
lens, they too concluded that “a reasonable factfinder could 
not determine that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to 
the risk of suicide.” App. at 15, 82–82.  
C 
In light of Iqbal, we must also overrule the framework 
we adopted for supervisory liability claims in Sample v. 
Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099 (3d Cir. 1989). The absence of 
deliberate indifference has not proven fatal to Barkes’s claim 
because the majority has determined that Barkes’s claim 
should be measured not by a pure deliberate indifference 
standard but by Sample, which enunciated a test unique to the 
supervisory context. The majority upholds Sample, noting 
that our old supervisory liability test already required the 
plaintiff to show deliberate indifference. Maj. Typescript at 
23–24. True though that statement is, it fails to recognize that 
Sample’s version of deliberate indifference differs markedly 
from the subjective version of deliberate indifference required 
under the Eighth Amendment and omits the personal 
involvement requirement that all but one of our sister circuits 
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have required. First, Sample does not require the supervisor’s 
actual knowledge. Its version of deliberate indifference is 
objective, Sample, 885 F.2d at 1118, meaning that a plaintiff 
could establish deliberate indifference by establishing that the 
supervisor should have known of the excessive risk to inmate 
health and safety even if the plaintiff admits the supervisor 
actually had no such awareness.  
Sample’s objective quality is patent, insofar as it 
fashioned a test based on the objective deliberate-indifference 
standard that the Supreme Court established for municipal 
liability in City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989). In 
Sample, we actually grappled with the fact that the record 
before us did not indicate that the supervisor had actual 
knowledge of the allegedly constitutionally inadequate prison 
procedures. Sample, 885 F.2d at 1118. But we answered that 
under Canton, 
this absence of prior incidents and knowledge 
thereof is not necessarily fatal to Sample’s case. 
As we have noted, [Canton] observed that there 
are situations in which the risk of 
constitutionally cognizable harm is so great and 
so obvious that the risk and the failure of 
supervisory officials to respond will alone 
support findings of the existence of an 
unreasonable risk, of knowledge of that 
unreasonable risk, and of indifference to it. 
Id. The majority admits that this part of the test we expressed 
in Sample is untenable today. Maj. Typescript at 31–32. 
Nevertheless, after denuding Sample of its objective quality, 
the majority upholds a test that does not require the plaintiff 
to plead personal involvement by the supervisor. Under 
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Sample, the plaintiff need only establish a “supervisory 
practice or procedure that [the supervisor] failed to employ.” 
Sample, 885 F.2d at 1118. That is a far cry from the 
“personally displayed deliberate indifference,” Nelson, 585 
F.3d at 535, or “deliberate, intentional act,” Porro, 624 F.3d 
at 1327–28; Dodds, 614 F.3d at 1195, that our sister circuits 
have required after Iqbal.  
 “Simply put, there’s no special rule of liability for 
supervisors. The test for them is the same as the test for 
everyone else.” Porro, 624 F.3d at 1328. None of the cases 
discussed—not even the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Starr—
has upheld a special test that applies only to supervisors. The 
majority disagrees, saying Sample’s “essence” is deliberate 
indifference, Maj. Transcript at 24, so we should continue to 
treat supervisors differently. Only by doing so, can the 
majority circumvent the District Court’s prior holdings that 
the record does not show deliberate indifference. App. at 15.
18
 
Sample’s unique combination of elements applies only to the 
supervisory form of deliberate indifference and permits 
Barkes to take her claim to trial without alleging Taylor and 
Williams’s personal involvement.   
                                                 
18
 The majority argues Barkes’s earlier claims are 
distinct, Maj. Transcript at 31, but it is a distinction without a 
difference. Whether Barkes argues Taylor and Williams 
failed to supervise DOC staff (as in the earlier claim) or FCM 
(as in the claim at issue now), knowledge and indifference is 
the common thread, and the fact that “there is still not 
sufficient evidence in the record from which a reasonable 
factfinder would conclude that Defendants were aware such 
an unreasonable risk was created and were indifferent to that 
risk” is fatal. App. at 16. 
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With due respect to my colleagues’ concern that Iqbal 
has “bedeviled” the courts of appeals, Maj. Typescript at 20, I 
perceive near unanimous agreement among our sister circuits. 
Barkes’s claim plainly seeks to hold Taylor and Williams 
vicariously liable for, in Barkes’s words, “presid[ing] over a 
system,” App. at 745, that she deems unlawful. Today’s 
decision invites plaintiffs to sue senior government officials 
whenever prison guards use force against an inmate or police 
officers mistreat a suspect. Regrettably, it exposes 
Commissioner Taylor and Delaware’s prison wardens to 
lawsuits from any Delaware inmate with a complaint about 
FCM’s services. “In an ideal world, [supervisors] would have 
achieved full compliance with the [law], but a public 
official’s inability to ensure that all subordinate . . . 
employees follow the law has never justified personal 
liability. . . . [S]upervisors are not vicariously liable for their 
subordinates’ transgressions.” Vance, 701 F.3d at 203.  
For these reasons, I would reverse the District Court’s 
denial of Taylor and Williams’s motion for summary 
judgment on qualified immunity. See Dodds v. Richardson, 
614 F.3d 1185, 1194 (10th Cir. 2010) (explaining that 
questions of supervisory liability, though part of the substance 
of a section 1983 claim, are also part of the qualified 
immunity analysis); al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 964–
65 (9th Cir. 2009) (same). None of the courts that have 
considered Iqbal have applied a standard like Sample’s, as the 
majority does today. The District Court’s prior decision that 
Barkes cannot prove Taylor and Williams’s deliberate 
indifference combined with the absence of any allegation of 
personal involvement on their part, entitles them to qualified 
immunity.  
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IV 
 Even had Iqbal not substantially changed the law of 
supervisory liability and had Sample remained good law, I 
would still hold that Taylor and Williams are entitled to 
summary judgment. According to Sample, the test for 
supervisory liability is as follows: 
Based on City of Canton, we conclude that a 
judgment could not properly be entered against 
[the supervisor] in this case based on 
supervisory liability absent an identification by 
[the plaintiff] of a specific supervisory practice 
or procedure that [the supervisor] failed to 
employ and specific findings by the district 
court that (1) the existing custom and practice 
without that specific practice or procedure 
created an unreasonable risk of prison 
overstays, (2) [the supervisor] was aware that 
this unreasonable risk existed, (3) [the 
supervisor] was indifferent to that risk, and (4) 
[the subordinate’s constitutional tort] resulted 
from [the supervisor’s] failure to employ that 
supervisory practice or procedure. 
885 F.2d at 1118. The District Court erred by omitting 
Sample’s threshold prerequisite, namely, that the plaintiff 
identify “a specific supervisory practice or procedure that [the 
supervisor] failed to employ.” Id.; accord Maj. Typescript at 
18. It applied only Sample’s enumerated elements without 
ever requiring Barkes to identify a supervisory practice and 
misstated Sample’s causation element by omitting the 
identified supervisory practice. Judge Farnan properly applied 
Sample when he granted Taylor and Williams summary 
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judgment on Barkes’s first supervisory liability claim, and his 
analysis turned on Sample’s threshold element. And although 
the majority has accurately spelled out the Sample test—
implicitly recognizing the District Court’s error—it errs in 
concluding that Barkes has satisfied this essential element.  
 Barkes’s complaint does not even attempt to make the 
identification required by Sample. Nevertheless, according to 
the majority: 
Appellees claim that Taylor and Williams 
should have enforced FCM’s compliance with 
their contractual obligations, specifically by 
requiring FCM to adhere to up-to-date NCCHC 
standards, by properly administering the 
standards to which they adhered, and by 
requiring mental health screenings to have been 
conducted by a qualified mental health 
professional rather than an unqualified LPN, 
thus satisfying Sample’s threshold requirement. 
Maj. Typescript at 46. The majority does not say where 
Barkes makes this contract enforcement allegation and my 
review of the pleadings failed to locate it either.  
But even if Barkes had made this allegation, her 
Sample claim would fail because “enforcing” a contract is not 
“a supervisory practice or procedure.” Sample’s threshold 
element forces the plaintiff to explain not just that the 
supervisor failed to act, but also what he should have done 
differently. As we cautioned in Sample: 
[I]t is not enough for a plaintiff to argue that the 
constitutionally cognizable injury would not 
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have occurred if the superior had done more 
than he or she did. The district court must insist 
that [the plaintiff] identify specifically what it is 
that [the supervisor] failed to do that evidences 
his deliberate indifference. Only in the context 
of a specific defalcation on the part of the 
supervisory official can the court assess whether 
the official’s conduct evidenced deliberate 
indifference and whether there is a close causal 
relationship between the “identified deficiency” 
and the “ultimate injury.”  
885 F.2d at 1118. Barkes’s contention that Taylor and 
Williams should have enforced the contract fails to meet our 
specificity requirements. The relevant question is: what 
“supervisory practice or procedure” should Taylor or 
Williams have implemented to enforce the contract? 
Commissioner Taylor already tasked a bureau with enforcing 
the FCM contract, and Warden Williams had no supervisory 
responsibilities over FCM. Pursuant to Delaware law, Joyce 
Talley, the chief of the DOC’s Bureau of Management 
Services, supervised FCM. Barkes’s utter failure to satisfy 
this element of Sample’s test underscores the fact that neither 
Taylor nor Williams supervised FCM. Barkes has targeted 
them merely as top-level DOC executives.  
 Even had Sample survived Iqbal, Taylor and Williams 
would be entitled to summary judgment. Judge Farnan 
granted them summary judgment on the first supervisory 
liability claim because Barkes failed to meet Sample’s 
threshold requirement. Barkes did not allege in her third 
amended complaint a specific supervisory practice that Taylor 
and Williams should have performed, and any allegations that 
Taylor and Williams should have “enforced” the contract 
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would do nothing to cure that omission. The District Court 
should have granted Taylor’s and Williams’s motion for 
summary judgment on the supervisory liability claim for the 
same reasons Judge Farnan did on the earlier supervisory 
liability claim. 
V 
 Finally, I disagree with the majority’s formulation of 
the constitutional right at issue. In addition to challenging the 
viability of supervisory liability after Iqbal, Taylor and 
Williams argued that Barkes’s asserted right was not “clearly 
established.” If true, that would also entitle them to qualified 
immunity. See Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 
(2012). They argued that our case law had not clearly 
established a right “to supervision of the medical vendor by 
the prison administrators.” Br. of Appellants at 19. The 
majority responds by stating “that the right [Barkes] assert[s], 
properly defined, is this: an incarcerated person’s right to the 
proper implementation of adequate suicide prevention 
protocols.” Maj. Typescript at 40. This is problematic for two 
reasons. First, the description of a right to suicide prevention 
protocols does not address Taylor and Williams’s argument 
that there is no clearly established right to supervision over 
those charged with developing and carrying out suicide 
prevention protocols since this supposed right concerns 
FCM’s responsibilities.19 
                                                 
19
 I disagree with the majority’s belief that Spruill v. 
Gillis, 372 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2004), established a right to 
supervision for a simple reason: Spruill was not a supervisory 
liability case, and the defendant had no supervisory 
relationship with the medical staff. 
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The more concerning error is that the majority’s 
articulation of the constitutional right departs from the Eighth 
Amendment case law. The majority claims this right “to the 
proper implementation of adequate suicide prevention 
protocols,” Maj. Typescript at 40, is established in our 
precedents, but it cites no case for this proposition, and I have 
found none. Indeed, the majority’s description of a right to 
“adequate suicide prevention protocols” (and for that matter, 
Barkes’s contention that FCM’s administration of the 
NCCHC’s 1997 standards by an LPN amounts to cruel and 
unusual punishment) would appear to be inconsistent with the 
weight of authority on this question. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Cnty. 
of Hennepin, 557 F.3d 628, 633 (8th Cir. 2009) (plaintiff’s 
allegations “that the Detention Center’s intake procedures 
were insufficient to identify certain types of serious injuries” 
failed because “the range of acceptable medical care is broad. 
Jailers bear only the responsibility to identify medical needs 
that are so obvious that even a layperson would easily 
recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.”); Brumfield 
v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322, 328 (5th Cir. 2008) (granting 
defendants summary judgment where jail had no written 
policy but an oral policy required officers to place a detainee 
in an observation cell if the detainee appeared suicidal); 
Belcher v. Oliver, 898 F.2d 32, 34–35 (4th Cir. 1990) (“The 
general right of pretrial detainees to receive basic medical 
care does not place upon jail officials the responsibility to 
screen every detainee for suicidal tendencies.”). 
Even if it were true that clearly established law 
mandated “adequate suicide prevention protocols,” the 
majority’s requirement of the “proper implementation” of 
those protocols plainly violates the basic proposition that the 
Eighth Amendment does not impose liability for negligence. 
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See Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 946 F.2d 1017, 1024 (3d 
Cir. 1991). “Failure to follow written procedures does not 
constitute per se deliberate indifference. If this were so, such 
a rule would create an incentive for jails to keep their policies 
vague, or not formalize policies at all.” Luckert v. Dodge 
Cnty., 684 F.3d 808, 819 (8th Cir. 2012) (granting supervisor 
qualified immunity when the prison’s “actual practice in 
dealing with suicide intervention . . . did not reflect [the 
prison’s] written policy”). 
*  *  * 
Barkes has targeted Taylor and Williams for 
“presid[ing] over a system.” App. at 745. This runs afoul of 
Iqbal and the substantial weight of authority among our sister 
courts, which holds that supervisors like Taylor and Williams 
cannot be liable under section 1983 absent their personal 
involvement. Even under the Ninth Circuit’s approach, 
Barkes would need to sue the person actually supervising 
FCM and cannot recover against the DOC’s top executives. 
None of the courts of appeals since Iqbal have upheld a 
supervisory liability test like Sample’s, which treats 
supervisors differently from everyone else.  
Even assuming arguendo that Sample remains good 
law, Barkes’s allegation that Taylor and Williams failed to 
enforce a contract with FCM does not satisfy Sample’s 
threshold element. Finally, the “right to the proper 
implementation of adequate suicide prevention protocols” is a 
departure from Eighth Amendment case law that had never 
been established before today. Because Taylor and Williams 
are entitled to summary judgment on the grounds of qualified 
immunity, I respectfully dissent.  
